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Deconstructing United States Sentencing
Guidelines Section 3A1.4: Sentencing
Failure in Cases of Financial Support for
Foreign Terrorist Organizations
James P. McLoughlin, Jr.t
Introduction
In 1994 Congress directed the United States Sentencing
Commission (Sentencing Commission) to create an "enhancement"
for prison sentences resulting from felonies involving international
terrorism.1 The result was section 3A1.4 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines or U.S.S.G.).2 This Guideline
worked to increase a defendant's Guidelines prison sentence
whenever the defendant was convicted of a felony that "involved,
or was intended to promote, international terrorism. ' 3 Events
since its inception have stretched U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 far
beyond its roots in international terrorism, giving it far-reaching
power and leading to devastating consequences.
In the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress
decided that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's enhancement power should
apply not only to international terrorism, but to domestic
terrorism offenses as well. 4 The amended U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4
applies when a defendant is convicted of an offense that involves
"5
or is intended to promote a "federal crime of terrorism,
"calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct." 6

t. The author is a member of the firm Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, 100 North
Tryon Street, Suite
4700, Charlotte, North
Carolina
28202-4003;
jimmcloughlin@mvalaw.com. He has represented defendants in terrorism cases,
including United States v. Hammoud in both federal district court and on appeal.
1. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 120004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022.
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 730, 110 Stat. 1214, 1303.
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a) (2007).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2009). Such an offense must also
be a violation of:
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Later terrorist activity caused Congress to expand U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 further. Prior to the events of September 11, 2001,
there were no base offense Guidelines for federal crimes of
(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37
(relating to violence at international airports), 81 (relating to arson within
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to
biological weapons), 175c (relating to variola virus), 229 (relating to
chemical weapons), subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of section 351 (relating to
congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and kidnapping),
831 (relating to nuclear materials), 832 (relating to participation in
nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States)
842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to
arson and bombing of Government property risking or causing death),
844(i) (relating to arson and bombing of property used in interstate
commerce), 930(c) (relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack
on a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) (relating to
conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad), 1030(a)(1)
(relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) resulting in damage
as defined in 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through (v) (relating to protection of
computers), 1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of officers and
employees of the United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter
of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons),
1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1361 (relating to government property or
contracts), 1362 (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations,
or systems), 1363 (relating to injury to buildings or property within special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1366(a)
(relating to destruction of an energy facility), 1751(a), (b), (c), or (d)
(relating to Presidential and Presidential staff assassination and
kidnapping), 1992 (relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of violence
against railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems on land,
on water, or through the air), 2155 (relating to destruction of national
defense materials, premises, or utilities), 2156 (relating to national defense
material, premises, or utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against
maritime navigation), 2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed
platforms), 2332 (relating to certain homicides and other violence against
United States nationals occurring outside of the United States), 2332a
(relating to use of weapons of mass destruction), 2332b (relating to acts of
terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2332f (relating to bombing of
public places and facilities), 2332g (relating to missile systems designed to
destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to radiological dispersal devices), 2339
(relating to harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing material
support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material support to
terrorist organizations), 2339C (relating to financing of terrorism), 2339D
(relating to military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization), or
2340A (relating to torture) of this title;
(ii) sections 92 (relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) or 236
(relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122 or 2284);
(iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy), the second sentence of section
46504 (relating to assault on a flight crew with a dangerous weapon), section
46505 (b)(3) or (c) (relating to explosive or incendiary devices, or
endangerment of human life by means of weapons, on aircraft), section 46506
if homicide or attempted homicide is involved (relating to application of
certain criminal laws to acts on aircraft), or section 60123 (b) (relating to
destruction of interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility) of title 49; or
(iv) section 1010A of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act
(relating to narco-terrorism).
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terrorism, 7 but when Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act
(PATRIOT Act)8 in the wake of September 11, the Sentencing
Commission created those Guidelines. 9 Among the offenses for
which the PATRIOT Act instituted new base offense Guidelines is
providing material support or resources to a designated foreign
terrorist organization (DFTO).lo Any prison sentence imposed
under these Guidelines is also subject to enhancement under
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4.11
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 works by lengthening the Guidelines
12
prison sentences to which defendants are otherwise subject.
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is not a base offense Guideline' 3 -it is
applied atop the new anti-terrorism and other applicable base
offense Guidelines. 14 When it comes into play, U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 has a dramatic impact on sentences by increasing both
factors in sentencing calculus-a defendant's offense level and
criminal history score. 15 The fact that it can be used to increase
7.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2002) (noting

that amendments under the USA PATRIOT Act modify existing Sentencing
Guidelines "for a number of offenses that, prior to enactment of the Act, were
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) as predicate offenses for federal crimes of
terrorism but were not explicitly incorporated in the guidelines"); see CARMEN D.
HERNANDEZ, AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES THAT TOOK
EFFECT NOv. 1, 2002 AND COMMISSION REPORT ON COCAINE SENTENCES 15 (2002),

http://www.fd.org/Publications/SpecTop/sentencing-amendment-highlights_112702
.pdf (detailing Sentencing Guidelines additions made after the USA PATRIOT Act
was enacted).
8. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2002).
10. Id.; see id. § 2M5.3.
11. United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3A1.4 applies to "Federal
Crimes of Terrorism" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.1 (2007). Under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5),
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339B by providing material support to terrorist
organizations is an offense that qualifies as a "Federal crime of terrorism." 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007); id. ch. 5, pt. A,
sentencing tbl.
13. Id. § 3A1.4.
14. Section 1B.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines explains how to
apply the Guidelines. Id. § 1B1.1. It specifies that the first steps in applying the
Guidelines are to determine the applicable offense Guideline and base offense level.
Id. § 1B1.1(a)-(b). The next step is to apply adjustments under Chapter Three. Id.
§ 1B.1(c). Section 3A1.4 of the Guidelines is contained within Chapter Three and
qualifies as a victim-related adjustment. See id. ch. 3, § 3A1.4. But cf. infra note
247 (discussing U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's failure to mention a victim and asserting
that Guidelines sections 2M5.3 and 2M6.1 are the relevant Guidelines for crimes of
material support and specifically mention victims).
15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4.
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sentences beyond those imposed under the new terrorism base
offense Guidelines, the breadth of its applicability, and its severity
make U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 a key component of the U.S.
government's anti-terrorism arsenal.
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is draconian. The minimum sentence
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 would impose under the 2007 Guidelines is
between 210 and 262 months. 16 The Guideline increases a
defendant's offense level to not less than thirty-two and increases
every defendant's Criminal History Category to Category VI.17 If
the offense level prior to the application of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4
is above level twenty, but below level thirty-two, the Guideline
adds twelve levels.' 8 For example, if the offense level prior to the
application of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is twenty-four, the offense
level after application of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 rises to level
thirty-six. 19 With a Criminal History Category VI, the resulting
sentencing range is between 324 and 405 months. 20
For a
defendant with a Criminal History Category VI, all offense levels
above level thirty-six require sentences ranging from 360 months
to life, 21 and at offense level forty-three, the Guidelines sentence is
life in prison.22
United States v. Hammoud23 illustrates U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4's impact when a defendant is sentenced for a material
support charge. Mohamad Hammoud was convicted of fourteen
charges arising from a cigarette smuggling conspiracy. 24 The crux
of the conspiracy involved the defendants purchasing cigarettes in
25
North Carolina, where the state tax was fifty cents per carton;
26
they then transported the cigarettes to Michigan, where the state

16. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
17. Id. § 3A1.4.
18. Id. § 3A1.4(a).
19. Id.
20. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005),
sentence vacated, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005).
24. Id. at 325-26.
The convictions particularly relevant to calculating
Hammoud's sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines arose from money
laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1) and (h), transportation of contraband cigarettes under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2342, and providing material support to a DFTO under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Id. at
325-26.
25. Id. at 326.
26. Id.
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tax was $7.50 per carton. 27 They sold the cigarettes illegally in
Michigan to take advantage of the tax arbitrage. 28 The majority of
the charges related to cigarette smuggling, 29 but two were
terrorism related: Hammoud was convicted of two counts of
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, first, for providing material support
to Hezbollah, a DFTO, and second, for conspiring to do so.3° As
calculated for sentencing, his sentence under the Guidelines
without U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 would have been between forty-six
and fifty-seven months given the jury findings; 31 the sentence
would have been 108 to 135 months imprisonment with additional
fact-finding by the trial court judge. 32 However, the trial court
judge determined by a preponderance of the evidence that
Hammoud, in knowingly providing material support for a DFTO,
intended to influence the conduct of government, 33 which brought
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 into play. 34 Applying U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 increased Hammoud's offense level by twelve levels and his
Criminal History Category, the measure of his criminal record,
went from Category I (since he had no criminal record) to Category
VI.35 These increases caused Hammoud's sentencing range to
jump to between 360 months and life imprisonment. 36 He was
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 361-62 n.1 (Motz, J., dissenting).
32. With all other enhancements used in the presentence Guidelines
calculation, Hammoud's offense level was a thirty-one (base level twenty-four with
enhancements for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (two levels), sophisticated
money laundering (two levels), leader and organizer of the conspiracy (four levels)
and obstruction (two levels)). Id. at 326-27. With a Criminal History Category I,
the sentencing range was 108 to 135 months. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2002).
33. Hammoud, 381 F.3d. at 362 (Motz, J., dissenting) (noting that the jury in
Hammoud's case determined that he had provided material support for a DFTO in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), but the judge determined by a preponderance
of the evidence that Hammoud had the specific intent to influence the conduct of
government); see 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (2000).
34. Hammoud, 381 F.3d. at 362 (Motz, J., dissenting); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2002).
35. Hammoud, 381 F.3d. at 362 (Motz, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 361 n.1, 363 (Motz, J., dissenting) (noting the base offense level and
Criminal History Category under which Hammoud's sentence would have been
determined based solely upon the jury's findings, then explaining the
enhancements to which Hammoud was subjected based upon U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4, which raised his base offense fourteen levels to level thirty-seven and his
Criminal History Category to IV). Under the adjusted based offense level and
Criminal History Category, the Guidelines prison sentence for Hammoud's
convictions rose to 360 months to life. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.
5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (2002).
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sentenced to 1860 months-155 years imprisonment. 37
To
appreciate fully the impact of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, the
maximum sentence for providing material support to a DFTO in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B without any enhancements at the
time Hammoud committed his offense was ten years in prison. 38
In order to evaluate U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, it is important to
look to the federal sentencing policies mandated by controlling
statute. Congress provided instructions on sentencing in 18
U.S.C. § 3 553(a)(2), directing that a sentence should be
sufficient, but not greater than necessary
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B)to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C)to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D)to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or39 other corrective
treatment in the most effective manner.
Section 3553(a)(1) instructs the court to consider "the history and
characteristics
of the
defendant" 40
in its
sentencing
determinations.
When considering U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 in light of these and
additional federal sentencing policy factors enumerated in
§ 3553(a)(3)-(7), 41 as well as the goals of a sound anti-terrorism
37. Hammoud, 381 F.3d. at 363 n.2 (Motz, J., dissenting).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000), amended by Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 810(d)(1), 115
Stat. 272, 380 (increasing the maximum prison sentence for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1) to fifteen years).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
40. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
41. The factors to consider are:
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category
of defendant as set forth in the guidelines(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1)
of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such
guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have
yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date
the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code,
taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy
statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have
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policy, two essential questions arise. First, does applying U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 result in a valid and appropriate sentence? Second,
does it represent good anti-terrorism policy? This Article submits
that the answer to both questions is "no."
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 represents bad anti-terrorism policy
for several reasons. First, the Guideline increases a defendant's
Criminal History Category to a level VI-the most culpable. 42 The
shift to Criminal History Category VI ensures that a defendant
will be sentenced as if he or she were a career criminal, 43 with no
empirical evidence that this is true or fair (under the
considerations contemplated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553).44 Second, the
Guideline automatically and uniformly increases a defendant's
offense level,45 ensuring a defendant will be sentenced as if his or
her offenses are among the most serious offenses addressed by the
Sentencing Guidelines, regardless of where the offense level fits on
the spectrum of "material support." 46 For example, U.S.S.G.
yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2)
of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such
policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3)-(7) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(b) (2007).
43. See id. § 4B1.1(a)-(b) (defining "career offender" and specifying that a
"career offender's criminal history category ... shall be Category V").
44. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) states that a court should consider "the
history and characteristics of the defendant" in considering the sentence it will
impose, which argues against automatically classifying a defendant. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1) (2006); see also infra Part X (discussing Criminal History Categories'
function in sentencing repeat offenders to longer prison sentences and asserting
that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's manipulation of a defendant's Criminal History
Category results in sentences commensurate with career offenders, without
evidence to show that offenders who commit crimes eligible for sentencing under
this Guideline are more likely to reoffend).
45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a) (2007).
46. Compare id. § 2A1.5(a) (setting the base offense level for Conspiracy or
Solicitation to Commit Murder at thirty-three), and id. § 2A4.1(a) (setting the base
offense level for Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful Restraint at thirty-two), and id.
§ 2G2.1(a) (setting the base offense level for Sexually Exploiting a Minor by
Production of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed Material: Custodian Permitting
Minor to Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for Minors to Engage
in Production at thirty-two), with id. § 3A1.4 (increasing the offense level for
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section 3A1.4 punishes the defendant who sends $500 to the social
services arm of a DFTO, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, the same as
the defendant who attempts to bomb the United Nations, or who
provides weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda. 47 As a result,
the sentences under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 are often
disproportionate to the conduct of conviction. 48
Finally, the
crushing increases in prison time under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 can
be imposed based upon a judge's finding under a preponderance of
the evidence standard, rather than jury findings under a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, 49 giving rise to constitutional concerns
and questions of fundamental fairness in our justice system.
When comparing U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 with the statutory
maximum penalties for terrorism-related offenses-which should
reflect Congressional judgment about the sentences appropriate to
deter and punish those offenses-and when contrasting its impact
with that of other Sentencing Guidelines addressing terrorism,
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's flaws become apparent. This Article
addresses the concerns U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 raises by focusing
on cases involving material support in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, the basic statute that criminalizes providing material
°
support for a DFTO5

defendants convicted of federal crimes of terrorism (which include providing
material support to a DFTO) to at least thirty-two).
47. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a) (failing to include
language providing for any distinction between felony offenses that "involveo, or
[were] intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism").
48. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANALYSIS OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994 (H.R. 3355, AS PASSED BY THE SENATE
NOVEMBER 19, 1993, AND BY THE HOUSE APRIL 26, 1994): PART II 13 (1994)

(emphasizing the possibility of prison sentences for terrorism cases underpunishing defendants, but noting that the mandate to provide an enhancement for
felonies promoting terrorism may present a problem "for the Commission [in] that
it may be difficult to develop a single fixed guideline enhancement for terrorism
that would appropriately account for the seriousness of the conduct in all cases. ...
[W]hile the terrorist goal may be serious in all cases, the specific crimes a
defendant may commit in furtherance of terrorism may not always reflect that
seriousness ....
In addition, defendants who share a common terrorist objective
may vary greatly in terms of the threat to persons and national security that they
realistically pose."). U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, however, takes a specific intent-the
intent "to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion,
or to retaliate against government conduct"--and elevates that factor to dwarf all
other factors. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (providing intent
requirement for a federal crime of terrorism); see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.1 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) for the
definition of federal crimes of terrorism).
49. See infra Part IV.B.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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The History, Structure, and Operation of U.S.S.G.
Section 3A1.4

U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 went into effect in November of 1995
pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (VCCLEA),51 which directed the Sentencing Commission to
"provide an appropriate enhancement" for felonies involving
international terrorism. 52 The existing terrorism Guideline was
then U.S.S.G. section 5K2.15, which had become effective
November 1, 1989. 5 3 U.S.S.G. section 5K2.9 addressed criminal
purpose, 54 and U.S.S.G. section 5K2.15 did not make a specific
substantive change to the Guidelines with regard to purpose and
terrorism, it simply authorized the court to increase the sentence
"[i]f the defendant committed the offense in furtherance of a
terroristic action." 55 In contrast, U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is more
specific. It reads:
(a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to
promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels;
but if the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase
to level 32.
(b) In each such case, the defendant's criminal history category
from Chapter Four (Criminal
History and Criminal
56
Livelihood) shall be Category VI.
Congress defined a "federal crime of terrorism" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b(g)(5) as an offense that:
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct; and
(B) is a violation of ... [18 U.S.C. §] 2339B (relating to
57
providing material support to terrorist organizations) ....
Somewhat ironically, just a few months prior to the date the
VCCLEA was enacted, the Sentencing Commission expressed
some concern with promulgating a too-explicit penalty
enhancement,5 8 but despite what could be read as a very general
51. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
52. Id. § 120004, 108 Stat. at 2022.
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.15 app. C, amend. 292
(1990).
54.
55.
56.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 5K2.9 (1987).
§ 5K2.15 (1990).
§ 3A1.4 (2007).

57. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006 & Supp. 2009). When this Article refers to a
"federal crime of terrorism" the reference is to statutorily defined crimes, not
common parlance.
58. The Sentencing Commission's report on the VCCLEA stated:
As a general principle, the Commission has opted for a more flexible
guideline departure, rather than a fixed guideline enhancement where a
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instruction from Congress in the VCCLEA, 59 the Sentencing
Commission adopted just such a very explicit Guideline. 60
After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and
instructed the Sentencing Commission to make U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 applicable to federal crimes of terrorism as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).61 The Conference Report on the AEDPA
noted that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 substantially increased prison
time for offenses related to international terrorism. 62 The report
explained that the amendment would be "applicable only to those
specifically listed federal crimes of terrorism, upon conviction of
those crimes with the necessary motivational element to be
established at the sentencing phase of the prosecution." 63 Thus,
one can argue there was some congressional endorsement of the
sentence increases, so long as the defendant was found to have
had the "necessary" motivation. However, as this Article argues,
the anti-terrorism statutes enacted after 2001 have sentences far
shorter than those mandated by U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4,64 and as
sentencing factor is atypical or when it may arise during the course of a
wide range of offenses of varying seriousness or in many forms. In such
situations it may be difficult to arrive at a fixed formula in calibrating the
seriousness of the factor with that of the underlying offense, although the
factor nevertheless may be an important sentencing consideration for the
court.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 48, at 13.
59. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 120004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022 ("The United States Sentencing Commission is
directed to amend its sentencing guidelines to provide an appropriate enhancement
for any felony, whether committed within or outside the United States, that
involves or is intended to promote international terrorism, as defined in section
2332b(g) of title 18, United States Code.").
60.

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (1995).

61. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 730, 110 Stat. 1214, 1303 ("The United States Sentencing Commission shall
forthwith ... amend the sentencing guidelines so that [§ 3A1.4] relating to
international terrorism only applies to Federal crimes of terrorism ... .
62. 142 CONG. REC. H3305-01, H3337 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996).
63. Id.
64. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007)
(mandating a minimum offense level of thirty-two and the maximum Criminal
History Category for a defendant (Category VI), a categorization that calls for a
minimum sentence of 210-262 months), with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006 & Supp.
2009) (subjecting violators who provide material support to terrorists who did not
cause a death to a maximum prison sentence of fifteen years (180 months)), and 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (subjecting violators who provide
material support to a foreign terrorist organization which did not cause a death to a
maximum prison sentence of fifteen years (180 months)), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339C(d)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (subjecting violators of § 2339(C)(a) who
finance terrorism to a maximum prison sentence of twenty years (240 months), and
violators of § 2339(C)(c) who aid in concealing terrorist financial resources to a
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such they are inconsistent with the view that Congress intended
sentences under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 to be as severe as they
65
are.
The Sentencing Commission expanded the scope and
application of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 upon passage of the
PATRIOT Act. 66 Effective November 1, 2002, U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 became applicable to offenses including harboring or
concealing a terrorist who has committed a crime of terrorism and
obstructing the investigation of a crime of terrorism. 67 More
controversially, the Sentencing Commission opined that U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 may be applied when the offense of conviction is not
one enumerated in the definition of a federal crime of terrorism,
but otherwise involved terrorism. 68 In addition, the Guideline's
Application Notes were amended to indicate that the Guideline
could be applied when a defendant's motive was to affect
government conduct, by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct or to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population. 69 Partly as a result, U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 has a
broader reach than one might ordinarily describe as terrorism
cases.
For example, in United States v. Jordi,70 the defendant was
found guilty of attempted arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) for
plotting to blow up abortion clinics. 71 The district court judge
believed that a higher sentence range than that provided by the
Guidelines was appropriate, 72 but denied the government's motion
maximum prison sentence of ten years (120 months)), and 18 U.S.C. § 2339D(a)
(2006 & Supp. 2009) (subjecting violators who receive military-type training from a
foreign terrorist organization to a maximum prison sentence of ten years (120
months)).
65. See infra Part II.
66. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2002);

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
67. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2002).

68. Id. ("[T]he amendment adds an encouraged, structured upward departure
in § 3A1.4 (Terrorism) for offenses that involve terrorism but do not otherwise
qualify as offenses that involved or were intended to promote 'federal crimes of
terrorism' for purposes of the terrorism adjustment in § 3A1.4.").
69. Id. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4; see also id. at app. C, amend. 637 (noting that the
amendment "makes it possible to impose punishment equal in severity to that
which would be imposed if the § 3A1.4 adjustment actually applied").
70. 418 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2005).
71. Id. at 1214; 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2002) (criminalizing "attempts to damage or
destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building.., used in interstate or
foreign commerce ... ").
72. Jordi, 418 F.3d at 1214.
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73
for an upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4,
believing that such a departure was only allowed with "a showing
74
that the defendant's crime transcended national boundaries."
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 could be
used to calculate Jordi's sentence, based on its reading of
Application Note 4, because the district court had determined that
Jordi "sought through his actions to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population."75

II. U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4 and Terrorism Sentences Under
Statute and Other Guidelines
A. Statutory Penaltiesfor Crimes Associated with
Terrorism
One measure of whether U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is good
sentencing and anti-terrorism policy is a comparison between the
penalties imposed under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 and the statutory
maximum penalties enacted by Congress for terrorism offenses,
It is logical to assume that
particularly financing offenses.
Congress enacted these criminal statutes with the penalties it
thought appropriate to deter and punish offenses, such that any
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1213. In a tape recording taken during a meeting with a confidential
source, the defendant said, "I do not have the means to kill abortion doctors, but I
do have the means to bomb clinics. Maybe that way I can dissuade other doctors
from performing abortions." Id. at 1214. The Eleventh Circuit found Jordi
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, and endorsed application of
the Guideline. Id. at 1214. Other circuits have taken similar action. In United
States v. Graham, the Sixth Circuit held that applying section 3A1.4 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines does not require that the defendant be convicted of a
crime specifically enumerated in § 2332b(g)(5)(B); it can be applied if the
government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
specifically intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B). United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir.
2001). The Graham court ruled that the sentencing court must identify the
enumerated federal crime of terrorism that the defendant intended to promote. Id.
The Ninth Circuit has held that when U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 does not apply to a
defendant because his or her offense is not aimed at the government and thus is not
a federal crime of terrorism, other sentencing Guidelines can be used to fill the
breach and enhance the defendant's sentence commensurate with what it would
have been had the crime fit the terrorism definition. United States v. Tankersley,
537 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008), (affirming a defendant's sentence under
U.S.S.G. section 5K2.0 that imposed a twelve-step upward departure in order to
"achieve sentencing parity between defendants who engaged in similar conduct:
with some targeting government property and who were properly subject to the
terrorism enhancement [U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4], and others targeting only private
property who were not"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2000) (defining "federal
crime of terrorism").

2010]

Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4

sentences imposed that are far above the statutory maximum-if
based solely on the conduct criminalized in statute-are
disproportionate.
That comparison establishes that U.S.S.G
section 3A1.4 results in far higher sentences than the statutes it
76
was intended to supplement.
18 U.S.C. § 2332a-Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
77
Through the VCCLEA, Congress codified 18 U.S.C. § 2332a,
making it illegal for an individual to use weapons of mass
destruction against a U.S. national or property within the United
States. 78 Under the statute an offender may face a prison sentence
of "any term of years or for life. '79 If a death results, however, an
80
offender may be sentenced to death.
1.

2.

18 U.S.C. § 2332b-Acts of Terrorism
Transcending National Boundaries

Eighteen U.S.C. § 2332b was promulgated under the
AEDPA.81 It criminalizes two types of actions. First, the statute
criminalizes killing, kidnapping, or maiming any person in the
United States, as well as any assault on a person in the United
States that results in serious bodily harm or is conducted with a
deadly weapon.8 2 Threats, attempts, and conspiracy to undertake
any of these actions are also punishable.8 3 Second, § 2332b makes
it illegal for an individual to create a substantial risk of bodily
harm by damaging property within the United States or

conspiring to do so.84
The statute imposes a range of prison sentences depending
upon the culpability of the conduct-from a low of ten years for
threatening to commit an enumerated offense8 5 to death if the

76. See supra note 64 (comparing sentences under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 with
statutory maximum sentences for federal crimes of terrorism).
77. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 60023(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1980.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 702(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1291-94.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1)(A) (2006).
83. Id. § 2332b(a)(2), (c)(1)(F), (c)(1)(G).
84. Id. § 2332b(a)(1)(B).
85. Id. § 2332b(c)(1)(G).
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defendant is responsible for a death.8 6 Prison sentences for
intermediate offenses include up to thirty years for assault
resulting in serious bodily injury,87 up to thirty-five years for
maiming, 88 and up to life imprisonment for kidnapping.8 9 The
statute provides that any sentences imposed shall run
consecutively, not concurrently. 90
18 U.S.C. § 2332d-Financial Transactions
Eighteen U.S.C. § 2332d addresses individuals in the United
States who engage in financial transactions with foreign
governments. 91 The statute was also passed as part of the
AEDPA.92 It provides that any individual in the United States
who "know[s] or ha[s] reasonable cause to know that a country is
designated.., a country supporting international terrorism" 93 and
enters into a financial transaction with that country's government
may be punished. 94 The maximum prison sentence for violating
§ 2332d is ten years. 95
3.

4.

18 U.S.C. § 2339A-Providing Material Support
to Terrorists

Eighteen U.S.C. § 2339A criminalizes providing material
support to groups that the defendant is aware will conduct
terrorist activities, or concealing such support. 96 Enacted in
1994, 97 § 2339A criminalizes conduct by which an individual
provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises
the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support
or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out a violation [of various
sections of Title 18, Title 42, Title 49 or any offense listed in 18
U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)] (except for sections 2339A and 2339B)
or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an

86. Id. § 2332b(c)(1)(A).
87. Id. § 2332b(c)(1)(D).
88. Id. § 2332b(c)(1)(C).
89. Id. § 2332b(c)(1)(B).
90. Id. § 2332b(c)(2).
91. Id. § 2332d(a).
92. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 321(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1254.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2332d(a).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
97. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2022.
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escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts
98
or conspires to do such an act ....
The enumerated offenses include those related to destruction of
aircraft or aircraft facilities, to biological weapons, nuclear
materials, arson and bombing of government property, destruction
of an energy facility, weapons of mass destruction, and acts of
terrorism transcending national boundaries, among others. 99
When enacted, anyone violating § 2339A was subject to
imprisonment for a maximum of ten years. 100 The PATRIOT Act
amended the statute to increase the maximum prison sentence to
fifteen years, or if death results, imprisonment for a term of years
or for life. 10 1
5.

18 U.S.C. § 2339B-Providing Material Support
or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations

Congress enacted § 2339B in 1996 as part of AEDPA.102
Section 2339B criminalizes conduct by which an individual
knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so ....
To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that
the organization is a designated terrorist organization[,]...
that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist
activity[,] ...or that the organization has engaged or engages
in terrorism ....103
Congress enacted § 2339B in part to close a perceived loophole in
§ 2339A that permitted those who thought they were donating to
charity to escape a material support charge.10 4 Under the current

98. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
99. Id. The statute specifies these offenses by reference to other sections of the
United States Code. Id. The statute was amended to expand the list of predicate
offenses by the AEDPA. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 323, 110 Stat. 1214, 1255.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, § 120005(a), 108 Stat. at 2022.
101. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 810(c), 115 Stat. 272, 380.
102. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 303(a), 110 Stat. at 1250.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). Eighteen U.S.C. § 2339B(g) provides relevant
definitions for terms used throughout the section. Id. § 2339B(g). Eighteen U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(2)-(f) provides for an extensive civil enforcement mechanism when a
financial institution becomes aware it has custody of DFTO funds.
Id.
§ 2339B(a)(2)-(f). Eighteen U.S.C. § 2339B(h) addresses providing personnel to
DFTOs as a form of material support. Id. § 2339B(h).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 104-383, at 43-45 (1995) (discussing First Amendment
protections on freedom of association and noting that "[t]he prohibition [against
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statute, a person need not have any intent to finance a specific act
of terrorism or to foster terrorism generally in order to be found
guilty. 105
Eighteen U.S.C. § 2339B incorporates § 2339A's
definition of "material support,"1S and, when enacted, had the
same
statutory
maximum
punishment-ten
years
imprisonment.107
The PATRIOT Act increased the statutory
maximum prison sentence to fifteen years, and also imposed a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment if a death resulted from
108
the prohibited activity.
The most recent change to § 2339B occurred in 2004 as part
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2001.109 Congress amended the definition of "material support" to
include "training" and "expert advice or assistance"'110 and added
the terms "any property, tangible or intangible, or service" to
expand the scope of impermissible support.'11 Congress also added
three subsections to § 2339B: §§ 2339B(h)-(j).11 2 A violation of
§ 2339B(h) occurs when an individual "knowingly provide[s],
attempt[s] to provide, or conspire[s] to provide a foreign terrorist
organization with 1 or more individuals.., to work under that
terrorist organization's direction or control, or to organize,
manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that
organization."" 3

financing terrorist activity] is not based upon the message or opinions espoused by
a particular organization.
Rather, the criminal prohibition is based on the
documented illegal acts of that organization."); see also Tom Stacy, The "Material
Support" Offense: The Use of Strict Liability in the War Against Terror, 14 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 461, 462-63 (2004) (discussing Congress' concerns in enacting 18
U.S.C. § 2339A and the fungible nature of money that allows terror organizations
to divert it from charitable purposes to criminal conduct).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (specifying that a person commits an offense
when he or she "knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization" and that a violation requires the person to "have knowledge"
of the organization's status or activities, but containing no language requiring that
a person act with intent in order to commit a violation (emphases added)).
106. See id. § 2339B(g)(4) ("[Tihe term 'material support or resources' has the
same meaning given that term in section 2339A .. "),
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1250.
108. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 810(d), 115 Stat. 272, 380.
109. Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118 Stat. 3638, 3762-64 (2004).
110. Id. § 6603(e), 118 Stat. at 3763.
111. Id. § 6603(a), 118 Stat. at 3762.
112. Id. § 6603(0, 118 Stat. at 3763-64.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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6.

18 U.S.C. § 2339C-Prohibitions Against the
Financing of Terrorism

As part of the Anti-Terrorism Conventions of 2002, Congress
codified 18 U.S.C. § 2339C.114 Section 2339C criminalizes two
types of conduct.
First, § 2339C(a) punishes collecting or
providing funds, and attempting or conspiring to collect or provide
funds, with the knowledge or intention that they will be used to
cause death or serious bodily injury in order to intimidate a
population or influence the actions of a government or
115
international organization.
Eighteen U.S.C. § 2339C presents a telling contrast with
§ 2339B. Under § 2339B, providing support to a DFTO knowing it
has or is engaged in terrorist activities is punishable by a
maximum of fifteen years imprisonment.1 16 In contrast, Congress
imposed a maximum sentence of twenty years for violating
§ 2339C(a) 11 7-only five years more than under § 2339B-by
providing support "with the intention that such funds be used, or
with the knowledge that such funds are to be used" to further an
act of terror with the motive of intimidating a population or
government.118 While violating § 2339B is untethered from any
specific act of terrorism or violence, a violation of § 2339C requires
proof that the defendant knew the funds raised would be used or
are intended to be used to fund an act of terrorism or other
specified act of violence." 9 This contrast is arguably the best
measure of Congressional priorities in defining the appropriate
difference in punishment between these two distinct mindsets. It
is also telling that this difference is dwarfed by the Sentencing
Commission's determination as reflected in U.S.S.G. section
20
3AI.4.
The second type of activity punished by § 2339C is concealing
material support knowing or intending that resources be provided
or are to be provided to a DFTO.121
The contrast between

114. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, §§ 202-203, 116 Stat. 724, 724-28.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)-(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
116. Id. § 2339B(a)(1).
117. Id. § 2339C(d)(1).
118. Id. § 2339C(a)(1).
119. Id. § 2339C(a)(1), (c)(2).
120. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c). The requirement that support go to a DFTO
originates with 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(c)'s requirement that an offender know or intend
that the support or resources provided were in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,
which, by its title, specifies that its provisions relate to DFTOs. Id. § 2339B.
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§ 2339C(c) and § 2339B is also instructive.
Eighteen U.S.C.
§ 2339C(c) criminalizes concealment of resources related to
violations of §§ 2339B or 2339C(a). 122 The maximum prison
sentence for a violation of § 2339C(c) is ten years regardless of the
underlying offense123-five years less than the maximum sentence
for "knowingly" providing the support in the first place under
24
§ 2339B.'
B. General Trends Among Terrorism Statutes
It is clear from the statutory scheme that Congress did not
intend to punish a financial supporter of a DFTO or organization
that commits a terrorist act as severely as an individual who
commits the act itself.1 25 The statutes addressing financing have a
core maximum prison sentence range of ten to fifteen years, with
126
the highest maximum at twenty years (unless a death results).
In contrast, the statutes that involve actual acts of terrorism or
weapons use carry longer terms-up to life imprisonment or
death. 127 These latter provisions address the primary perpetrators
of violent acts of terrorism and are far more punitive. This
difference suggests that Congress found financiers less dangerous
or less culpable than the terrorists they finance, and so chose not
to punish them as harshly. 128
Charting these and other anti-terrorism statutes, it appears
that the penalties are meant to be proportional to the culpability of
the conduct, to the injury that can be directly attributed to a
defendant's actions, and to the nature of the organization's actions.
In summary, the analysis demonstrates:
*When Congress set a maximum prison sentence for providing
funds to a terrorist organization with the specific intent that
the funds be used to commit a crime of terrorism or violence
intended to intimidate a population or a government,
Congress limited the term of imprisonment to twenty

years. 129
122. Id. § 2339C(c).
123. Id. § 2339C(d).
124. Id. § 2339B(a)(1)
125. Compare id.§ 2332a-b, with id. §§ 2332d, 2339A-C.
126. Id. §§ 2332d, 2339A-C.
127. Id. §§ 2332a-b.
128. See, e.g., Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1014 (7th Cir.
2002) ('The fact that Congress imposed lesser criminal penalties for the financial
supporters indicates perhaps that they found the financiers less dangerous or less
culpable than the terrorists they finance ... .
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a).
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" When Congress changed the statutory maximum prison
sentence for providing material support to a DFTO with the
less culpable mindset that the individual knows the
organization is a DFTO and knows the DFTO is engaging or
has engaged in terrorist acts, but does not intend to fund an
act of terrorism or violence, it increased the sentence by five
180
years to a maximum of fifteen years.
" Congress authorized life in prison for material support of a
1 1
DFTO only when a death or kidnapping occurs. 3
A more thorough cataloging of the anti-terrorism statutes confirms
the conclusion that extended terms of imprisonment (greater than
ten or fifteen years) are reserved for crimes or acts of violence and
32
acts that result in maiming and death.

130. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 810, 115 Stat. 272, 380; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
132. See infra tbl.1.

70
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Table 1: Material Support Crimes: Maximum Terms of Imprisonment
Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 18 U.S.C. § 2332a
§ 2332a(a)

Using, threatening, attempting, or
conspiring to use a weapon of mass
destruction if death results

Death or life
imprisonment

§ 2332a(a)

Otherwise (if no death results)

Any term of years or
for life

Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries: 18 U.S.C. § 2332b
§ 2332b(c)(1)(A)

For a killing or if death results from
other conduct covered by § 2332(b)

Death or for any
term of years or for
life

§ 2332b(c)(1)(B)

For kidnapping

For any term of
years or for life

§ 2332b(c)(1)(C)

For maiming

Thirty-five years
imprisonment

§ 2332b(c)(1)(D)

For assault with a dangerous weapon
or if serious bodily injury results

Thirty years
imprisonment

§ 2332b(c)(1)(E)

For destroying or damaging a structure
or personal property

Twenty-five years
imprisonment

§ 2332b(c)(1)(F)

For conspiracy or attempt

Same as if the
offense had been
completed

§ 2332b(c)(1)(G)

For threatening to commit one of the
above

Ten years
imprisonment

Financing Transactions with a Country
International Terrorism: 18 U.S.C. § 2332d
§ 2332d

Designated

as

Supporting

Ten years
imprisonment
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Providing Material Support to Terrorists: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A
§ 2339A(a)

If death results

Life imprisonment or
a term of years

§ 2339A(a)

Otherwise (if no death results)

Fifteen years
imprisonment

Providing Material Support to DFTOs: 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
§ 2339B(a)(1)

If death results

Life imprisonment or
a term of years

§ 2339B(a)(1)

Otherwise (if no death results) (after
2001)

Fifteen years
imprisonment

§ 2339B(a)(1)

Otherwise (before 2001)

Ten years
imprisonment

Prohibitions Against Financing Terrorism: 18 U.S.C. § 2339C
§ 2339C(a)(1)

Providing or collecting funds with the
intention or knowledge the funds are to
be used to carry out
(A) an act which constitutes an offense
within the scope of a specified treaty; or
(B) any other act intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or other person not taking an
active part in hostilities in a situation
of armed conflict, when the purpose of
such an act, by its nature or context, is
to intimidate a population or to compel
a government or an international
organization to do or abstain from
doing any act

Twenty years
imprisonment

§ 2339C(c)(2)

Knowingly concealing or disguising the
nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of any material support or
resources
(A) knowing or intending that the
support or resources were provided, in
violation of § 2339B; or
(B) knowing or intending that any such
funds are to be provided or collected, or
knowing that the funds were provided
or collected, in violation of § 2339C(a)

Ten years
imprisonment
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III. Base Offense Guidelines for Terrorism Prison
Sentences Compared to U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4
Remembering that the objective is to assess whether U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 results in an appropriate sentence for a violation of

the statutes criminalizing material support for terrorism and
supports a rational anti-terrorism policy, this Article next looks to

the other Sentencing Guidelines addressing terrorism. Having
contrasted the impact of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 with the statutory
penalties for financing and other anti-terrorism offenses, one can

contrast the impact of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 with the Sentencing
Commission's efforts to craft
sentencing in terrorism cases.

base

offense

Guidelines

for

A.

U.S.S.G. Section 2M5.3-ProvidingMaterial Support or
Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizationsor Specially Designated Global Terrorists
or for a TerroristPurpose
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 was promulgated effective November
1, 2002 under the PATRIOT Act. 133 It is a base offense Guideline

13 4
found in the "Offense Conduct" section of the Guidelines.
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 applies to offenses under §§ 2339B and

2339C.135
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 sets a base offense level of twenty-six,
which means a prison sentence range from sixty-three to seventyeight months for a defendant in Criminal History Category I, and
a range of 120 to 150 months for a defendant with a Criminal
History Category VI.136 The Guideline takes into account "Special
Offense Characteristics," including whether
the offense involved the provision of (A) dangerous weapons;
(B) firearms; (C) explosives; (D) funds with the intent,
knowledge or reason to believe such funds would be used to
purchase any of the items described in subdivisions (A)
through (C); or (E) funds or other material support or
resources with the intent, knowledge, or reason to believe they

133. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (2002)
(noting that the amendment was enacted in response to the PATRIOT Act and that
it created a new Guideline at section 2M5.3 for offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
134. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3 (2007). Specifically,
section 2M5.3 falls under section 2, part M, which covers "Offenses Involving
National Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction." Id. ch. 2, pt. M.
135. Id. § 2M5.3 cmt. statutory provisions; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); 18
U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(B).
136. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
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are to be used to commit or assist in the commission of a
137
violent act ....
It also directs a sentencing judge to refer to other Guidelines in the
event that an offense resulted in death, was tantamount to
attempted murder, or involved the defendant providing certain
types of weapons. 138
It is important to note that U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3(b)(1) has
an internal enhancement mechanism to calibrate the severity of
the sentence to the culpability of the conduct and the harm. 139 For
example, the means of support a defendant could provide are
broken down-support can take the form of dangerous weapons,
explosives, or funds provided with the intent or reason to believe
that those funds will be used to purchase those items or to be used
to commit a violent act-so that under this Guideline providing
1 40
support demonstrates an intent to finance an act of violence.
141
Such an act results in an increase of two offense levels.
That
jump results in the median sentencing range for a defendant
increasing between seventeen months (for a defendant in Criminal
History Category I) and eighteen months (for a defendant in
Criminal History Category VI).142
B. U.S.S.G. Section 2M6.1-Unlawful Activity Involving
Nuclear Material, Weapons, or Facilities,Biological
Agents, Toxins, or Delivery Systems, Chemical Weapons,
or Other Weapons of Mass Destruction;Attempt or
Conspiracy
U.S.S.G. section 2M6.1 is another important point of
comparison when mapping the sentencing landscape in order to
assess the proportionality of a sentence under U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4. U.S.S.G. section 2M6.1 sets a base offense level of twentyeight for most offenses to which it applies.1 43 It, too, has an

137. Id. § 2M5.3(b)(1).
138. Id. § 2M5.3(c).
139. Id. § 2M5.3(b)(1).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. The range for offense level twenty-six
within Category I is sixty-three to seventy months, and the range for offense level
twenty-eight within Category I is seventy-eight to ninety-seven months. Id. At
Category VI, offense level twenty-six results in a sentence of 120 to 150 months and
offense level twenty-eight runs between 140 and 175 months. Id.
143. Id. § 2M6.1(a)(2); see id. § 2M6.1(a)(3)-(4) (providing statutes whose
offenses carry different base offense levels); see also id. § 2M6.1(a)(1), (4) (listing
special considerations which, when present, can alter the base offense level of
twenty-eight).
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internal enhancement mechanism to calibrate the sentence based
upon the severity of the offense and the harm.1 44
Under
subsection (b), such factors as whether the offense involved a
threat to use a weapon of mass destruction, whether any victim
died, and whether the offense caused substantial disruption of
public, governmental, or business functions can increase the base
offense level under the Guideline.145
C. Base Offense Guidelines and U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4
The sentences generated by U.S.S.G. sections 2M5.3 and
2M6.1 on the one hand and section 3A1.4 on the other are
significantly different because their approaches are different.
First, and most importantly, in determining the defendant's
Criminal History Category, the base offense Guidelines rely on a
defendant's actual criminal history, 146 while U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 creates a legal presumption that a defendant belongs in
Criminal History Category VI.147 Second, the base offense levels
under U.S.S.G. sections 2M5.3 and 2M6.1 are twenty-six and
twenty-eight, respectively, 148 but the minimum offense level under
149
section 3A1.4 is level thirty-two.
Two examples help demonstrate the contrasts between
U.S.S.G. sections 2M5.3, 2M6.1, and 3A1.4. Assume an individual
is convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, that is, providing
material support to a DFTO with knowledge that the organization
is a DFTO and that it has engaged in terrorist acts. Assume also
that the defendant provided the funds with knowledge that the
funds may be used to assist in committing some unspecified future
violent act in order to intimidate a government. Further assume
that the defendant has two prior felony convictions.
Under
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 alone the defendant's base offense level is
twenty-eight and the Criminal History Category is IH.160 The
sentencing range under the Guideline is between 87 and 108

144. Id. § 2M6. 1(a) (providing for base offense shifts for such factors as whether
the offense was committed with the intent to harm the United States or the type of
weapon(s) involved in the offense).
145. Id. § 2M6.1(b).
146. Id. §§ 2M5.3, 2M6.1 (containing no mention of any adjustment to Criminal
History Category for defendants).
147. Id. § 3A1.4(b) ("In each such case [where the offense was a felony intended
to promote a federal crime of terrorism], the defendant's Criminal History
Category ... shall be Category VI.").
148. Id. §§ 2M5.3(a), 2M6.1(a)(2).
149. Id. § 3A1.4(a).
150. Id. § 2M5.3(a).
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months. 151
If the defendant is sentenced with the added
application of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, the defendant's offense level
rises to forty and his or her Criminal History Category increases to
VI.152 This enhancement results in a sentencing range increase to
between 360 months and life153-an increase of 273 months on the
low end and life on the high end of the range.
Now, assume a second defendant who provides material
support to a DFTO by providing a biological toxin with intent to
coerce a government.
Under U.S.S.G. section 2M6.1 the
defendant's base offense level is forty-two.154 With no prior
convictions, and thus a Criminal History Category I, the
sentencing range is 360 months to life. 155 Applying U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4, the offense level would be the highest possible, a
level forty-three, and the Criminal History Category would rise to
VI.156
Taken together, the defendant's sentence rises to life

imprisonment. 157
Applying U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 results in Sentencing
Guidelines ranges that may cause glaring disparities in terrorism
sentences because a less culpable defendant may receive a greater
increase in his or her sentence than a defendant who commits a
more serious offense.
This possibility reveals flagrant
inconsistencies in sentencing policy. 158
One must ask what

151. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
152. Id. § 3A1.4(a).
Under Guidelines section 3A1.4, a felony offense that
involved or was "intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism" receives a base
offense level increase of twelve levels-an offense level of twenty-eight under
section 2M5.3 would become forty. Id. The Guidelines place the defendant in
Criminal History Category VI. Id. § 3A1.4(b).
153. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
154. Id. § 2M6.1(a).
155. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
156. Id. § 3A1.4.
157. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. This theoretical calculation assumes that
applying Guidelines sections 2M6.1 and 3A1.4 does not create a double jeopardy
violation, so both would and could be applied concurrently. See infra Part IV.A.
The court could, however, depending on the circumstances of the offense, choose not
to start at a base level forty-two, but to use a lower base offense level, possibly a
level twenty-eight.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2M6.1(a),
2M6.1(a)(2). In theory, if the district court were to find that the defendant
intended to aid a DFTO, as instructed in section 2M6.1, the court would be obliged
to apply section 2M6.1(a)(1), because the court is required to assign the highest
base offense level. Id. § 2M6.1(a)(1).
158.
Cf. United States v. McMorrow, 471 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that
imposing a 360-month prison sentence on a defendant convicted of mailing
threatening communications, extortion, and threatening to use a weapon of mass
destruction was within the range allowable by the Sentencing Guidelines); United
States v. Neskini, 319 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that applying Guidelines
section 3A1.4 did not violate due process rights of a defendant with no prior
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U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 adds to the equation that improves
sentencing or anti-terrorism policy when it creates such draconian
anomalies that (in the case of defendants who are foreign
nationals) become newsworthy in the countries from which the
defendants have come fostering a belief that the U.S. justice
system is biased and fundamentally unfair. 159 It is difficult to find
anything but detriment in this result.
IV.U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4 and the Constitution
A. Double Jeopardy
The policy conundrum over U.S.S.G.'s failure to require
additional legal conclusions is properly understood to be a
constitutional flaw as well. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that no
"person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." 160 Blockburger v. United States161 is the controlling
double jeopardy sentencing case.
Under the Supreme Court's Blockburger analysis, the
definitive issue is whether a defendant has been punished twice
for the same conduct, i.e., whether his or her convictions are
multiplicitous. 162 In Blockburger, the defendant was charged with
violating the Harrison Narcotic Act for selling morphine. 163 The
defendant was found guilty on three of five counts 164 and appealed,
asserting, inter alia, that selling drugs to the same person on
165
consecutive days should constitute a single continuous offense.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that each of Blockburger's
charges represented distinct offenses because each required proof
of distinct conduct. 166 The Blockburger test for a Double Jeopardy
Clause violation is whether the second statute of conviction
requires proof of an essential element that is different from the
essential elements of the first offense.1 67 If the two statutes of

convictions).
159. Cf. David Feige, The Real Price of Trying KSM: Defense Lawyers Will
Inevitably CreateBad Law, SLATE, Nov. 19, 2009, http://slate.com/id/2236146/.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
162. Id. at 301.
163. Id. at 300-01.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 301.
166. Id. at 301-04.
167. Id. at 304 ('Trhe applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
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conviction require proof of the same elements, the defendant's
constitutional right to be free from multiplicitous punishment has
been violated and he or she may be punished under only one of the
However, if the two offenses have distinct
two offenses.1 68
elements, a single transaction may result in conviction under more
than one statute without violating the defendant's Fifth
169
Amendment right against double jeopardy.
In the sentencing context, the Blockburger test has been
applied to the Sentencing Guidelines most often in cases involving
gun offenses when a defendant has been charged with a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), prohibiting possession of a firearm or
ammunition by a list of individuals, including felons, illegal aliens,
or anyone committed to a mental institution. 170 But the key point
is that the Blockburger analysis has been applied to the
Sentencing Guidelines, 171 carrying implications for terrorism
sentences as well.
Let us take the example of defendants convicted of two
similar terrorism-related crimes: providing material support to a

determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not.").
168. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punishment.").
169. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300-01 ("A single act may be an offense
against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt
the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other."' (quoting Morey
v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871))).
170. United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2K2.1 provides that if a
defendant is convicted of violating § 922(g) and the defendant possessed the firearm
in connection with another felony, the base offense level rises from a level twelve to
a level eighteen. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (2007). When the
defendant comes into possession of the firearm as the result of a burglary, the
question is whether the firearm and ammunition were "possessed in connection"
with the burglary (another felony) to result in an upward adjustment under
section 2K2.1(b)(6). Defendants have argued that another "felony offense" must be
an offense distinct from the conduct by which the defendant acquired the firearm.
See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 858 F. Supp. 434, 438-41 (D.N.J. 1994) (rejecting
defendant's claim that a five year sentence enhancement as a result of his
possession of firearm during a hijacking violated the Double Jeopardy Clause). The
government has argued under a Blockburger analysis that the possession of the
firearm and the possession in connection with another felony require proof of an
essential element that is different, so the adjustment should apply. Id. Courts that
have addressed the question have found that the Blockburger analysis is the
clearest analysis under which to do this calculation. Id. at 438; United States v.
Stewart, 780 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Fla. 1991).
171. See United States v. McAninch, 994 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that the "relevant comparison in determining whether there was double
counting" between two Guidelines is to compare the applicable Guidelines
provisions, not the Guidelines provisions and the criminal code).
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DFTO under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and providing funds knowing that
they are to be used to promote a federal crime of terrorism under
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(B). The base offense levels for both of
these crimes are determined under U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3,172 and
both offenses are subject to sentence enhancements under
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 if the offense qualifies as a federal crime of
terrorism.173 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), these offenses are
federal crimes of terrorism if they are "calculated to influence or
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to
retaliate against government conduct .... 174
In the case of the defendant convicted of knowingly providing
material support to a DFTO under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, assume that
the government cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the offense in a manner "calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct"'175 as
required for the offense to qualify as a "federal crime of
terrorism.1 76 The defendant would be sentenced solely under
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3.1 77
Because U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4
178
requires proof of a fact that U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 does not,
applying both U.S.S.G. sections 3A1.4 and 2M5.3 would not result
in a double jeopardy violation under Blockburger.

172. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3, cmt. statutory provisions
(2007) (specifying the statutory provisions to which the Guideline applies and
listing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B, 2339C(a)(1)(B)).
173. Id. § 3A1.4, cmt. n.1; 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A). This intent requirement is one of two factors
that determine whether an offense is a federal crime of terrorism. Id. § 2332b(g)(5).
The other factor is whether an offense violates one in a specified list of statutes. Id.
§ 2332b(g)(5)(B). Violations of §§ 2339B and 2339C are on this list. Id.
175. Id. § 2332b(g)(5)(A).
176. Id. § 2332b(g)(5); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.1.
177.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (designating Guidelines

section 2M5.3 as the applicable Guideline for violations of § 2339B).
178. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.4(a), 3A1.4(a) cmt.
n.1 (specifying that the Guideline applies to felonies involving or intended to
promote federal crimes of terrorism and referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) for the
definition of federal crimes of terrorism), and 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (providing the
definition for federal crimes of terrorism, which includes the requirement that such
offenses be "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct'), with U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3 (lacking any requirement that the
Guideline apply only to federal crimes of terrorism or to offenses that are
"calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct").
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However, let us assume instead a hypothetical defendant
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(B) of a single transaction
of providing funds knowing that they are to be used to promote a
federal crime of terrorism. Since the conviction itself is based on a
determination that the defendant acted with a purpose to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, 179 as soon as the defendant has been convicted all
elements are present to enhance his or her sentence under
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4.18 0 Thus, one can argue that our defendant
suffers from a double jeopardy violation under Blockburger
because he or she would receive multiple punishments for the
same conduct-one under the base offense Guideline and then an
enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4-since both Guidelines
rely on conviction for the same essential elements and findings of
fact. However, this is the lesser of the constitutional questions
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 raises.
B. Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and CircumventingProof to
a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
In a classic Blockburger analysis, prosecutions under
§§ 2339B and 2339C do not present a double jeopardy problem
because their intent elements differ: § 2339B criminalizes
"knowingly" providing material support to a DFTO, 181 while
§ 2339C criminalizes collecting or providing funds with the
"intention that such funds be used, or with the knowledge that
such funds are to be used" to harm a civilian with the purpose of
"compel[ling] a government.., to do or to abstain from doing any
act." 182 But sentencing these offenses under U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 poses a different constitutional issue. In order to obtain a
conviction under § 2339C(a)(1)(B), a jury must find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted with a purpose to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion. 183
As noted above, such a conviction would then
automatically be subject to a sentence enhancement under

179. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (criminalizing any act with
the purpose "to intimidate a population, or to compel a government.., to do or
abstain from doing any act").
180. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.1 (applying the
Guideline to all federal crimes of terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5));
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
182. Id. § 2339C(a)(1).
183. Id. § 2339C(a)(1)(B).
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U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4.184 However, a conviction under § 2339B
requires only that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant knowingly provided funds to a DFTO-it requires no
determination that the defendant knew the funds were to be used
to support terrorism.18 5 In order for this conviction to be subject to
a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, a judge
must determine that the defendant's actions were "calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct"'s 6-and he or
she may make this determination under the lower preponderance
of the evidence burden of proof.1 87 In this way the government can
get the same sentencing "bang for its buck" by seeking a jury
conviction under the easier to prove § 2339B offense, then getting
a judge to determine that the defendant acted with the requisite
intent for a U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 sentence enhancement under a
lower burden of proof.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment '8 8
and the Trial by Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 89 "any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."1 90 The Supreme Court
considered whether this requirement extends into the sentencing
realm in Apprendi v. New Jersey.19 1 In Apprendi, the defendant
fired a gun into the home of an African American family, claiming
that he "[did] not want them in the neighborhood."' 192 Apprendi
pled guilty to three of twenty-three counts in the indictment
against him, 193 and the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the other
charges. 194
At sentencing, however, the state requested an
enhanced sentence for an offense committed with a biased

184. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4, cmt. n.1 (applying the
Guideline to all federal crimes of terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5));
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (defining "federal crime of terrorism").
185. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) ('To violate this paragraph, a person must have
knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization.... that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity..., or that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism .... " (emphasis added)).
186. Id. § 2332b(g)(5)(A).
187. See infra Part IV.B.1-2.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
189. Id. amend. VI.
190. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
191. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
192. Id. at 469.
193. Id. at 469-70.
194. Id. at 470.
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purpose. 195 After an evidentiary hearing into Apprendi's purpose,
the trial court judge found by a preponderance of evidence that
Apprendi had acted "with a purpose to intimidate" under the
The judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years
statute. 196
imprisonment on the enhanced count; 197 without the enhancement
the offense would have carried a Guidelines sentence range of five
to ten years.198
The Supreme Court held that the enhancement statute was
unconstitutional. 199 "Other than the fact of a prior conviction,"
said the Court, "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
200
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Cases following Apprendi have affirmed its basic holding. In
Blakely v. Washington,20 1 the Court heard the case of a defendant
who pled guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife. 20 2 Based upon
the facts admitted, Blakely faced a maximum prison sentence of
fifty-three months. 20 3 The sentencing court, however, determined
sua sponte that Blakely had the specific intent of acting with
deliberate cruelty with respect to the underlying offense (second
degree kidnapping). 20 4 The judge sentenced Blakely to ninety
months imprisonment. 20 5 But the Supreme Court held that "the
'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."20 6 The
Court invalidated Blakely's sentence as inconsistent with the
20 7
Sixth Amendment.
United States v. Booker 20 8 involved two defendants charged
with drug crimes. 20 9 Defendant Booker was found guilty in a jury

195. Id.
196. Id. at 470-71.
197. Id. at 471.
198. Id. at 469-70 (identifying Count Eighteen, to which Apprendi pleaded
guilty, as a second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose charge and
noting that second-degree offenses carry a penalty range of five to ten years under
state law).
199. Id. at 491-92.
200. Id. at 490.
201. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
202. Id. at 298.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 300.
205. Id. at 298.
206. Id. at 303.
207. Id. at 305.
208. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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trial under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 210 and faced a Guidelines
sentence of between 210 and 262 months in prison. 211 But during
the sentencing proceeding Booker's trial judge concluded by a
preponderance of the evidence that Booker had possessed
additional drugs and was guilty of obstructing justice. 212 The
Guidelines range for Booker's sentence jumped to between 360
months and life.213 The judge sentenced him to thirty years. 214
In the same case, defendant Fanfan was convicted of
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. 215 The jury found that Fanfan possessed an amount of
cocaine that would have qualified him for a sentence enhancement
of five or six years. 216 Without additional findings, his Guidelines
maximum prison sentence was seventy-eight months. 217
At
Fanfan's sentencing hearing the trial judge found additional facts
that elevated the Guidelines-recommended sentence to between
188 and 235 months. 21 8 The trial judge declined to follow the
enhancement required by the additional fact-finding, and
sentenced Fanfan in accordance with the jury verdict. 219
The Booker Court held that Blakely, with regard to maximum
statutory sentences, also applies to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. 220 It explicitly endorsed the Apprendi holding that
"[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 221 The Court found, however, that making the Sentencing
Guidelines mandatory was "incompatible" with the constitutional
requirement that sentence enhancements be heard by a jury. 222

209. Id.
210. Id. at 227.
211. Id. In addition, the statute under which Booker was charged prescribed a
minimum prison sentence often years. 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2002).
212. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 228.
216. Id. (noting that the jury answered "yes" to the specific question of whether
the amount of cocaine involved was 500 grams or more, and that the jury verdict
would have required an enhanced sentence of five or six years).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 229.
220. Id. at 243.
221. Id. at 244.
222. Id. at 245.
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Instead, the Court ruled that the Guidelines are "effectively
advisory." 223
Both Booker's and Fanfan's sentences were
224
remanded in light of the Court's decision.
1.

The Applicable Standard of Proof Required for
U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4

After Booker and Blakely, there is a serious argument that
unless a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
had the intent required to apply U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, there is a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the Trial by Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in
Apprendi.225 U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 can be distinguished from the
statute at issue in Apprendi only on the grounds that U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 is "discretionary." 226 But even after these cases the
Sentencing Commission has continued to support a preponderance
of the evidence standard for Guidelines application. 227 Courts

223. Id.
224. Id. at 267-68.
225. This represents a change from cases prior to Booker, in which the Supreme
Court authorized use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in the majority
of sentencing determinations. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997)
(per curiam) (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986))
(authorizing the use of the preponderance of the evidence, but noting "a divergence
of opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant
conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on clear and
convincing evidence."); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)
(explaining that when the disputed factor becomes "a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense," due process requires the element to be a consideration of the
sentence and not an element of the offense).
226. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3, -3(e) (1995) ('The court shall, upon
application of the prosecuting attorney, sentence a person who has been convicted
of a crime ... to an extended term if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,"
that there are grounds to show that the defendant "acted with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity"), with U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2007), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
245 (2005) (holding that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are "effectively
advisory").
227. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (2007) (post-dating
Booker and stating that "[tihe Commission believes that use of a preponderance of
the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy
concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of
a case."). But cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 ("Any fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."); id. at 319 n.6 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he commentary to [Guidelines section] 6A1.3 states
that '[t]he [Sentencing] Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy
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have followed suit, ruling that juries need not find sentencedeterminative facts because sentencing is discretionary, and that
there is no constitutional problem so long as the sentence imposed
22 8
is below the "statutory maximum."
In United States v. Gray,229 a district court in West Virginia
heard the case of two men charged with drug trafficking. 230 The
defendants pled guilty, 231 and the judge held a hearing to
determine their sentences. 232
During the sentencing phase,
however, the judge declined to rule that the Constitution required
233
that he find the facts at sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt,
and decided that for future cases, after first using the
preponderance standard to determine the facts, 234 he would
measure his findings against the reasonable doubt standard to
inform himself of how much deference to accord those facts in
determining the advisory Guidelines range. 235 Judge Goodwin
explained his reasoning this way:

concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of
a case.'
The Court's holding today corrects this mistaken belief. The Fifth
Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance of
the evidence, of any fact that increases the sentence beyond what could have been
lawfully imposed on the basis of facts found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant.").
228. Cf. United States v. Pirnani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005)
("Nothing in Booker suggests that sentencing judges are required to find sentenceenhancing facts beyond a reasonable doubt under the advisory Guidelines
regime."); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The
sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts
relevant to the determination of a Guideline sentencing range and all facts relevant
to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence."); United States v. Graham, 275
F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2001) (vacating defendant's sentence for charges relating to
weapons, drugs, and conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States
because the sentence exceeded the combined maximum prison sentences of all
counts of conviction and thus represented an Apprendi violation).
229. 362 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. W.Va. 2005), affd 491 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2007).
230. Id. (holding that the application of the preponderance of the evidence
standard to guilty pleas for drug charges did not violate the Sixth Amendment).
231. Id. at 716-17.
232. Id. at 717.
233. Id. at 720 (explaining that it is a "long-standing and deeply cherished
tradition" to rely on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at sentencing, but
finding that doing so is not constitutionally required).
234. Id. at 723 (noting that in the future the judge would first use the
preponderance of the evidence standard when considering the facts of a case).
235. Id. ("Accordingly, after I calculate and consider the advisory Guidelines for
each defendant by a preponderance of the evidence in accordance with Booker, I
will consider what the Guideline range would be if based solely on conduct that I
have found beyond a reasonable doubt. While this additional consideration is no
more binding on my determination than the advisory Guidelines themselves, it will
help me to weigh the reliability of the advice provided by the Guidelines, and will
inform the exercise of my discretion as I determine an appropriate sentence in light
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The burden of proof represents a substantive embodiment of
social values regarding the risk of error.
Furthermore,
'standards of proof are important for their symbolic meaning
as well as for their practical effect.' The reasonable-doubt
standard in particular serves as a reminder and a message
that 'in the administration of criminal justice, our society
imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.' As a tool
for reducing the risk of error, reasonable doubt retains its
usefulness in the advisory regime. As Justice Harlan noted in
his concurrence in [in re] Winship, the chosen standard of
proof operates 'to instruct the fact-finder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.'
The practical effect of fact finding at sentencing, even under
the advisory regime, is most often to increase a defendant's
period of incarceration based on findings that I make by a
preponderance of the evidence. The risk of error is not
insignificant or inconsequential. Even though the defendant is
already theoretically exposed to the maximum prison term
allowed by statute, an erroneous factual determination
regarding relevant conduct at sentencing will likely result in a
longer period of incarceration than if the determination were
not made. It therefore seems important to consider the risk of
error when calculating the advisory range of incarceration.
The reasonable-doubt standard presents a useful tool for
closing the margin of error in this context. In essence, it helps
me to measure the degree of certainty that I have in
the
236
Guideline advice before I sentence a defendant to prison.
2.

Judges or Juries: Who Decides Whether to Apply
U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4?

It is not just the standard of proof that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4
calls into question; one must ask whether it should be a judge or a
jury who makes a finding with such an impact on the sentence. In
Ring v. Arizona,237 the Supreme Court held, "[i]f a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the
finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it235
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."

of the advisory Guideline range and the 3553(a) factors.").
236. Id. at 722-23 (citations omitted); accord United States v. Thomas, 360 F.
Supp. 2d 238, 241 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that the impact of a finding of crack
versus powder cocaine has an extraordinarily powerful impact on the sentence and
the court is justified in requiring more proof than the testimony of a chemist
identifying the substance as cocaine base and that of an agent stating that in his
opinion it was crack).
237. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
238. Id. at 602 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000)).
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In Booker, the Supreme Court discussed the trend of
legislatures selecting facts that authorize or mandate heavier
sentences, thereby increasing the judge's power and diminishing
that of the jury.239 The Court explained:
As the enhancements became greater, the jury's finding of the
underlying crime became less significant.
And the
enhancements became very serious indeed. As it thus became
clear that sentencing was no longer taking place in the
tradition that Justice Breyer invokes [in his dissent], the
Court was faced with the issue of preserving an ancient
guarantee under a new set of circumstances. The new
sentencing practice forced the Court to address the question
how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful
way guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the
individual and the240power of the government under the new
sentencing regime.
The Supreme Court found that it did not matter which body
decided to enhance a sentence, saying:
Regardless of whether Congress or a Sentencing Commission
concluded that a particular fact must be proved in order to
sentence a defendant within a particular range, "[t]he
Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that,
before depriving a man of 10 more years of his liberty, the
State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its
accusation to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals
and neighbours,' rather than a lone employee of the State."24 1
No one should doubt that the framers would be troubled by a judge
ruling that a sentence that would be no more than fifty-seven
months under the Sentencing Guidelines based upon the findings
of the jury rises to 1860 months based upon a district court judge's
findings, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, 242 that
239. As the Court stated:
In 1986. . . our own cases first recognized a new trend in the legislative
regulation of sentencing when we considered the significance of facts
selected by legislatures that not only authorized, or even mandated,
heavier sentences than would otherwise have been imposed, but increased
the range of sentences possible for the underlying crime .... The effect of
the increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing ranges,
however, was to increase the judge's power and diminish that of the jury.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236 (2005).
240. Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
241. Id. at 238 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004)).

242. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 362-63 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Motz, J., dissenting), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), sentence vacated, 405 F.3d

1034 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[The judge made findings with respect to numerous facts
that had never been considered by the jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the basis of these findings, the district judge sentenced Hammoud not to 57
months, but to 155 years.... [Tihe district judge 'reduced' Hammoud's sentence
from the Guidelines range of life to 'only' 155 years-the total maximum sentence

authorized under the statutes governing the offenses for which Hammoud was
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the defendant intended "to influence or affect the conduct of
243
government by intimidation or coercion."
Blakely and Booker appear to indicate that to some as yet
unspecified degree, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply in the
sentencing context. 244 Under the Booker remedy, sentencing is a
hybrid, neither purely discretionary nor mandatory, but "still
245
profoundly influenced by the rules, namely the Guidelines."
Disputed facts that increase the Guidelines range continue to have
a measurable effect on the sentence and may be determined by the
judge by a preponderance of the evidence. 246 The question is will
the Supreme Court draw the line for discretionary consideration of
facts, and if so, where?
V. U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4 and Intent Requirements for
Crimes Supporting Terrorism
To apply U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, the sentencing court need
not find additional facts or reach additional legal conclusions-the
Guideline applies without proof of any conduct or motive beyond
that covered by the base offense Guideline in each case. 247 This is
convicted."); see also id. at 327 (majority opinion) (explaining that the terrorism
enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 placed Hammoud in Criminal History
Category VI with a base offense level of forty-three, indicating a sentence of life
imprisonment); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbI
(2007) (indicating a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant in Criminal
History Category VI with base offense level forty-three). See infra Part VI for a
discussion of courts' sentence "stacking" practices, which led to Hammoud's
sentence.
243. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 356 (explaining the district court's conclusion, and
the circuit court's approval of that conclusion, that Hammoud's offenses were
committed with the intent that qualified them as federal crimes of terrorism); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2009) (noting the intent requirement
for a federal crime of terrorism).
244. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305.
245. United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 152 (D. Mass. 2005)
("Sentencing today-even post-Booker is still profoundly influenced by the rules,
namely the Guidelines. That is what the remedy opinion admonishes; that is what
the post-Booker case law suggests. It is, in effect, a hybrid regime-neither purely
discretionary nor mandatory Guidelines."); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 ("The
district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.").
246. See infra Part VIII.
247. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (containing no mention of
enhanced requirements for an offender's conduct or motive). One could try to
defend the anomaly by arguing that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is found in Chapter
Three of the Guidelines, which houses "victim related" adjustments. Id. ch. 3, pt. A
(outlining Guidelines' "Victim-Related Adjustments"). The flaw with this argument
is that, despite the chapter heading, Guidelines section 3A1.4 is in no way
dependent upon the harm or the victim; the section makes no mention of either. Id.
§ 3A1.4(a) (specifying that sentencing increases are contingent upon the offender's
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so even though U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 does contain a
particularized intent requirement; its application to felonies
requires that a defendant committed a federal crime of terrorism
"calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion." 248 This requirement illustrates the
disconnect between U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
Violating § 2339B is not, on its face, a "federal crime of
terrorism"-it requires only that a defendant provide support with
the knowledge the recipient is a DFTO.249 Thus applying U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 punishes a defendant who has pled guilty to § 2339B
as if he or she had committed a different offense than the crime of
conviction.2 50 Reinforcing this conclusion is that the predicate at
issue is "offense conduct"--classically an essential element of the
251
crime.
If Fifth Amendment due process is to be meaningful after
Booker, and if that due process is to be properly understood in
light of the protections of the Sixth Amendment, then the
argument can be made that this predicate must be found beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury.
VI. Conviction on Multiple
Counts and
Sentences Under U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4

"Stacking"

U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's impact is most devastating when a
defendant is compelled to plead to multiple counts or goes to trial
and is convicted of multiple counts. In criminal cases, the
government's power to drop charges as an incentive for the
intent to promote a federal crime of terrorism without mentioning requirements for
victims or resulting harm). Guidelines sections 2M5.3 and 2M6.1 are the terrorism
Sentencing Guidelines that provide for base offense adjustments based on victims
and resulting harm. Id. §§ 2M5.3(c)(1)-(3), 2M6.1(b)(2)-(d)(1).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (defining "federal crime of terrorism" and
incorporated by reference into Guidelines section 3A1.4); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4, cmt. n.1.
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006 & Supp. 2009); see also id. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)-(B)
(designating a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B a federal crime of terrorism, but only
when a defendant's conduct is also "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government
conduct").
250. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (requiring a
finding of a felony which intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism), with 18
U.S.C. § 2339B (requiring a finding of knowingly giving material support or
resources to a terrorist organization or attempting or conspiring to do so).
251. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000) ("[We agree
wholeheartedly... that merely because the state legislature placed its hate crime
sentence 'enhancer' 'within the sentencing provisions' of the criminal code 'does not
mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element
of the offense."' (citation omitted)).
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defendant to plead guilty is coercive 252-one may argue whether
this discretion is good or bad, but one cannot argue that a
reduction in the number of charges, especially those carrying
higher sentences, is a powerful tool to "encourage" a defendant to
plead guilty.25 3 This dynamic could have particularly serious
consequences in terrorism cases when the defendant faces the
prospect of being sentenced under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4.
The Sentencing Guidelines, which many U.S. circuit courts
have adopted as reasonable standards, 25 4 instruct courts that if the
Guidelines sentence is higher than the maximum statutory
sentence for the most serious offense, then the sentences for the
offenses of conviction should be "stacked"-imposed to run
consecutively, not concurrently-until the Guidelines sentence is
reached. 255 As a result, a defendant who is convicted of a single
material support charge and a series of minor related or unrelated
offenses can face a sentence dramatically greater than the
statutory maximum. The greater sentence is not the result of the
Sentencing Guideline's grouping protocol reflecting cumulative
culpability for all of the charged offenses; rather, it is the result of
the fact that the minor unrelated charges can add fuel to U.S.S.G.
25 6
section 3A1.4.
252. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 157 (2d. Cir. 1999) (advocating
for discretion on the part of prosecutors in avoiding duplicitous charges for a single
action while recognizing that prosecutors are granted absolute immunity and given
the presumption of proper conduct).
253. See Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d 287, 291 (2d. Cir. 1989) (asserting that plea
bargaining can be seen as coercive where prosecutors promise to drop certain
charges in exchange for guilty pleas).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Chriswell, 401 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The
Supreme Court in Booker severed the statutory provisions which made the
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory in nature, thus rendering the Guidelines
,effectively advisory.' However, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) remains in effect and binding
on federal courts, which 'requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together
with other sentencing goals.' Thus, the proper interpretation of the various
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines remains vitally important for this court.");
United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Although Booker
excised the mandatory duty to apply the Guidelines, the sentencing court remains
under a duty pursuant to § 3553(a) to "consider" numerous factors ....
This duty
to 'consider' the Guidelines will ordinarily require the sentencing judge to
determine the applicable Guidelines range even though the judge is not required to
sentence within that range."); United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 76
(1st Cir. 2005) ("Under the post-Booker approach, 'district courts, while not bound
to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account
when sentencing,' subject to review by the courts of appeals for
,unreasonableness."').
255. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(d) (2007).
256. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 276-282 (providing examples of
how minor charges can result in higher sentences under Guidelines section 3A1.4).
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Standard GroupingCalculations

Ordinarily, a defendant's total sentence is determined by
"grouping" criminal conduct pursuant to U.S.S.G. sections 3D.13D1.5. 257 U.S.S.G. section 3D1.1(a) instructs a sentencing court
258
U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2
first to "group" closely related counts.
the same harm
substantially
specifies that "[aill counts involving
259
Counts involve
shall be grouped together in a single Group."
same victim
the
substantially the same harm when they "involve
260
"the same
involve
Counts that
and the same act or transaction.
by a
connected
victim and two or more acts or transactions
common
a
of
common criminal objective or constituting part
scheme or plan" also involve substantially the same harm and
261
should be grouped.
After the counts are grouped, a court must determine each
262
The
Group's offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 3D1.3.
court then determines the combined offense level under the rules
2 63
If the counts are grouped
set out in U.S.S.G. section 3D1.4.
pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2(a)-(c), the offense level is that
264
Alternatively, if
of the most serious of the counts in the Group.
the counts are grouped pursuant to U.S.S.G. section 3D1.2(d)because the severity of the grouped counts is measured by the
total harm or loss, for example in fraud cases-the offense level
applicable to the Group is determined by the aggregate quantity at
issue, for example, the quantity of drugs, the amount of tax
avoided, etc. 265 With these grouping calculations in hand, U.S.S.G.
section 3D1.4 instructs the court to start with the Group having
the highest offense level and increase that offense level as required
'266
Each offense constitutes
based upon the number of total "units.

257. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3D1.1-3D1.5 (2007).
258. Id. § 3D1.1(a)(1).
259. Id. § 3D1.2.
260. Id. § 3D1.2(a).
261. Id. § 3D1.2(b); see also id. § 3D1.2(c) (dictating that conduct should also be
grouped "[w]hen one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific
offense characteristic" in another guideline).
262. Id. § 3D1.3.
263. Id. § 3D1.4 (increasing incrementally defendants' overall offense level
according to the number and severity of collateral offenses); see also id. §§ 3D 1.1(d),
5D.2 (excluding counts which involve a mandatory minimum sentence or a
statutory instruction that determines imprisonment).
264. Id. § 3D1.3(a).
265. Id, § 3D1.3(b); see id. § 3D1.2(d).
266. Id, § 3D1.4.
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one unit or one-half unit, depending on its severity in comparison
267
to the level of the highest Group.
If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest
statutory maximum adequately achieves the total sentence
required by the Guidelines, the sentences on all other counts shall
run concurrently. 268 In contrast, if the crime carrying the highest
statutory maximum is less than the total Guidelines punishment,
then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall
be added to run consecutively until the Guidelines sentence is
reached. 269 For example, a defendant convicted of five counts may
face a Guidelines sentence of fifteen years after his or her offenses
are grouped. If one of the five counts has a statutory maximum of
ten years and the remaining counts have a statutory maximum of
five years each, the sentencing court is instructed to sentence the
defendant to the statutory maximum of ten years and to impose a
consecutive sentence on the next count to reach the Guidelines
sentence of fifteen years. 270 The sentences on the remaining three
counts are to run concurrently 271-resulting in imprisonment for
fifteen years. 272
Though some criticize the mechanisms of
"grouping," the general effect of grouping and counting units is
intended to result in a sentence that reflects the cumulative
weight of the criminal behaviors and the resulting harms. 273 The
result most often reduces the impact of ancillary and minor related
274
offenses on the sentence.
B. Grouping Calculations Under U.S.S.G. Section 3A1.4
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 drives the process differently. Assume
a defendant is convicted of material support in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2339B for sending financial contributions to a DFTO, the
current statutory maximum prison sentence (if no death results) is

267. Id. §§ 3D1.4(a)-(b), 3D1.4 cmt. n.1, 3D1.4 cmt. background.
268. Id. § 5G1.2(c).
269. Id. § 5G1.2(d).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. ("Convictions on multiple counts do
not result in a sentence enhancement unless they represent additional conduct that
is not otherwise accounted for by the guidelines. In essence, counts that are
grouped together are treated as constituting a single offense for purposes of the
guidelines.").
274. See id. ("'The amount of the additional punishment declines as the number
of additional offenses increases.").
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fifteen years. 275 If the only count on which the defendant has been
convicted is § 2339B, the court should impose a sentence no longer
than fifteen years. 276
If, however, the defendant has also
committed other crimes, the sentencing court is instructed by the
Sentencing Guidelines to impose the maximum fifteen year
sentence for the violation of § 2339B, then to "stack" sentences for
the other convictions to reach the Guidelines sentence.2 7 7 If a
court applies U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, the maximum prison
27 8
sentence rises to 262 months.
For a § 2339B violation carrying a base offense level of
twenty-six (the starting point under section 2M5.3),279 applying
U.S.S.G section 3A1.4 boosts the offense level to thirty-eight 280 and
the Guidelines sentence range increases to 360 months to life. 281 If
stacking a defendant's sentences leads to a sentence of 360 months
as permitted under this calculation, the defendant may receive a
sentence of twice the fifteen-year statutory maximum sentence for
material support. 28 2 These sentence increases are not driven by
grouping under the Guidelines to punish for the collateral
offenses; rather, they are driven solely by the material support
charge, producing the possibility of a thirty year sentence based on
an offense that otherwise carries a statutory maximum sentence of
fifteen years.
For constitutional and policy purposes one must recognize
that dramatically increased sentences do not result from an
assessment of culpability after a thoughtful analysis of the entire
complex of a defendant's convictions. Rather, it is the disparity
between sentencing under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 and the
statutory maximum prison sentence for a single act of material
support under § 2339B that can, and often does, drive this
anomaly. Whether courts apply U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 or not

275. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
276. Id.
277. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(d) (2007).
278. Id. § 3A1.4 (specifying that a defendant convicted of one violation of
§ 2339B should be sentenced with a base offense level of thirty-two and a Criminal
History Category of VI), ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (indicating that a defendant
with a base offense level of thirty-two and a Criminal History Category of VI should
receive a prison sentence of between 210 and 262 months).

279. Id. § 2M5.3.
280. Id. § 3A1.4(a) ("If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to
promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels .... ").
281. Id. § 3A1.4, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. This calculation also takes into
account Guidelines section 3A1.4(b), which sets a defendant's Criminal History
Category at VI. Id. § 3A1.4(b).
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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determines whether defendants receive dramatically disparate
sentences for the very same conduct.
This incongruity gives prosecutors overwhelming leverage to
force defendants to forego trial by jury. By pushing for or agreeing
to lobby against applying U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, prosecutors can
manipulate the sentences among comparable defendants. 28 3 A
prosecutor's threat to seek a sentence enhancement under
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 can force a defendant into a Hobson's choice
between pleading guilty to a terrorism offense to secure a shorter
sentence, or risking life imprisonment if he or she is convicted at
trial and the judge determines by a preponderance of evidence that
the defendant had the requisite intent to commit a federal crime of
terrorism. 28 4 This choice may also encourage defendants to engage
in other undesirable conduct, for example, providing false
testimony to ensure credit for cooperation and secure a more
favorable sentence. The standard of proof in sentencing, coupled
with the practice of stacking consecutive sentences for each
conviction to achieve the Guidelines sentence calculated under
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, gives prosecutors tremendous power and
so distorts the criminal justice system.
Few courts have upheld challenges to stacked sentences in
terrorism cases. 285 In United States v. Rahman,2 6 the Second
283. Disproportionality is a significant concern for courts. See Kimbrough v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007) (noting that the goals of sentencing
include avoiding "unwarranted sentenc[ing] disparities"); Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 599 (2007) (noting that the goals of sentencing include avoiding
"unwarranted sentenc[ing] disparities"); see, e.g., Thurston v. United States, 358
F.3d 51, 73 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), on remand, 456 F.3d 211
(1st Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 854 (2008) (imposing a sentence of three months
where Guidelines range was sixty-three to seventy-eight months to avoid
unwarranted disparity with co-defendant and promote respect for law); United
States v. Colby, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D. Me. 2005) (comparing proportionality of codefendants sentenced pre- and post-Booker's holding that courts must consider
whether applying the sentencing Guidelines would result in "unwarranted
sentencing disparities"); United States v. Revock, 353 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129 (D. Me.
2005) (imposing a sentence on the defendant outside the Guidelines range so that
he received the same sentence as a co-defendant); United States v. Gray, 362 F.
Supp. 2d 714, 718-19 (S.D. W.Va. 2005), aff'd, 491 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2007)
(imposing a sentence of ninety-seven months on both defendants, despite the fact
that the Guidelines sentence range for one defendant would have been between 97
and 121 months and the Guidelines sentence range for the co-defendant would
have been between 135 and 168 months, due to the judge's determination that they
had equal culpability).
284. See supra Part IV.B.
285. Cf. United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 83 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that
defendant's stacked sentence for drug crimes was not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment); United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 493 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding
the stacked sentence of individuals associated with a terrorist group for their
violations of federal gun laws).
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Circuit addressed stacking arising from the same criminal
conduct. 287 Defendant El-Gabrowny's conviction for seditious
conspiracy and lesser charges resulted from conspiracies to bomb
the United Nations, the Holland Tunnel, and the Lincoln
Tunnel. 288 Under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, the defendant could
have received a prison sentence of life, 289 even though the
statutory maximum prison sentence for seditious conspiracy was
twenty years. 290 The district court gave El-Gabrowny a fifty-seven
year sentence, 29 1 which resulted from stacking the sentences of
each charge in order to approach the Guidelines punishment of life
in prison. 292 The district court judge believed that the sentence
was excessive, 293 and, if not for his belief that the Guidelines
restricted a judge's sentencing discretion, would have sentenced
El-Gabrowny to a total of not more than thirty-three years. 294 The
Second Circuit recognized that the government's decision to charge
El-Gabrowny with multiple minor counts made a sentence far
295
above the statutory maximum for seditious conspiracy possible.
296
The court remanded the sentence,
reasoning that the district
court judge, Judge Michael B. Mukasey, did not give sufficient
consideration to his power to depart downward. 297 This decision

286. 189 F.3d 88, 157 (2d. Cir. 1999).
287. Id. at 154-58.
288. Id. at 103-04. El-Gabrowny was convicted of seditious conspiracy, two
counts of assaulting a federal officer, five counts of possessing a fraudulent foreign
passport (as a result of five false passports), one count of possession with intent to
transfer false identification documents, and one count of impeding the execution of
a search warrant as a result of resisting agents in front of a co-conspirator's
apartment. Id.
289. Id. at 145-46 (calculating the defendant's base offense level through an
analogy to the crime of treason and discussing the applicable adjustments,
resulting in a maximum prison sentence of life); see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (1992) (indicating that offense level forty-three
warrants a life sentence for all criminal history categories).
290. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1994).
291. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 148.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 158 (noting that the district court judge believed a lesser
sentence was appropriate, but that he "[did] not believe that the guidelines le[ft
him] free to impose that sentence").
294. Id.
295. See id. at 151 (noting that "the consecutiveness of the defendants'
sentences that carried their cumulative punishment above 20 years could not have
occurred unless they had been convicted of other counts.").
296. Id. at 160.
297. Id. at 157-58 ('The departure authority here has not previously been
settled in this Circuit, and Judge Mukasey's sentencing remarks .. imply that he
thought he lacked departure authority.").

2010]

Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4

was based upon the fact that U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 trumps
grouping principles:
There is no reason to think that the [Sentencing] Commission
gave adequate consideration to the extent to which
[El-Gabrowny's] sentence could be extended by multiplication
of essentially duplicative charges for a single criminal act ....
We believe the prosecutor's ability to lengthen sentences in
these circumstances simply by adding essentially duplicative
counts, each describing the same criminal conduct, is a
circumstance that was not adequately considered by the
Sentencing Commission when it devised the formula for
consecutive sentencing under § 5G1.2(d).
It therefore
298
establishes a permissible basis for downward departure.
The Second Circuit gave a specific example of how U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 frustrates the principles that underlie grouping convictions
for conspiracy and for the substantive act:
Before the Guidelines, prosecutors could hope to enhance
sentences above statutory maximums by charging defendants
with both conspiring to commit a crime and the substantive
offense of committing it, and judges sometimes rewarded that
expectation by imposing consecutive sentences for both
offenses. The Guidelines substantially ended that practice by
providing that a conspiracy offense and the substantive
offense that was the sole object of the conspiracy are to be
grouped together and sentences for the two offenses will
normally not be consecutive, except to the extent necessary to
reach the total punishment for the most serious of the grouped
299
counts.
In its ruling, the Second Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 3584 gave
the district court discretion to decline to impose consecutive
sentences even though U.S.S.G. section 5G1.2(d) (and section
00
3A1.4) might appear to require consecutive sentences.
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court
has discretion within the range suggested by the Guidelines so
long as it does not exceed the "statutory maximum" prison
sentence. 30 1 Most of the courts post-Booker have assumed, without

298. Id. at 157.
299. Id. at 153-54 (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 155; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) (1994) ("The court, in determining
whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively,
shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being
imposed, the factors set forth in Section 3553(a).").
301. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (rendering the
Guidelines advisory by requiring that a sentencing court consider Guidelines
ranges but allowing the court to tailor the sentence to other concerns); see also
United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) ("When Justice
Breyer's opinion [in Booker] is retroactively applied on direct review, the guidelines
are deemed to have been 'effectively advisory.' This means that the various top
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thorough analysis, that the "statutory maximum" is not the
statutory maximum for a single offense, but is the total of the
statutory maximums of all of the offenses for which the defendant
is convicted. 302 This assumption has historical validity, 303 and
under a grouping analysis it is not harmful because there is a
check against prosecutors who seek to bury a defendant under a
host of minor offenses. 30 4 U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 reverses that
30 5
check.
The impact of this reading of Booker is that a defendant
sentenced under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 will likely find himself or
herself sentenced to far more than the statutory maximum for
material support-based solely on that charge-if he or she is
convicted of multiple counts. Booker's holding-rendering the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory-was arguably intended to resolve
the question of whether judges may make findings used to

ranges of the guidelines are no longer binding, and therefore, no longer constitute
'little relevant maximums.' This leaves as the only maximum sentence the one set
out in the United States Code. Justice Breyer's opinion making the guidelines
advisory essentially changes what sentence is authorized by a jury verdict-from
the sentence that was authorized by the mandatory guidelines to the sentence that
is authorized by the U.S. Code." (citation omitted)).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Sadler, 538 F.3d 879, 892 (8th Cir. 2008)
(finding, in case involving defendant convicted of two drug offenses, that, "[b]ecause
each offense would have a statutory maximum of twenty years' imprisonment and
because a district court may 'run sentences from multiple counts consecutively,
rather than concurrently, if the Guideline sentence exceeds the statutory maximum
sentence for each count,"' a sentence of 322 months (nearly 27 years) was "well
within the statutory maximum available to the court" (citations omitted)); United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 195 (4th Cir. 2007) ('The statutory maximum for
each count ... is sixty months.
Because the Guidelines range exceeded the
statutory maximum for one count, and [defendant] Reinhardt was convicted of
multiple counts ... the Guidelines allowed the district court to 'stack' multiple
counts consecutively to achieve a sentence within the Guidelines range. There is
no evidence in the record that the district court acted improperly in following the
mandate of the Guidelines and increasing Reinhardt's maximum sentence to
seventy months." (citations omitted)). But see, e.g., United States v. Foy, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 1055, (N.D. Iowa 2009) (asserting that neither advisory Sentencing
Guidelines nor statutory maximums limit consecutive sentences in stating that
"the sentencing court may use consecutive sentences on multiple counts to impose
the sentence that the court considers to be appropriate in light of the § 3553(a)
factors, notwithstanding either advisory guidelines or statutory maximum
sentences.").
303. See supra notes 257-274 and accompanying text.
304. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Dl.l(a) (2007) (instructing
the sentencing court first to "group" closely related counts); id. § 3D1.2 (instructing
that "all counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together
into a single Group.").
305. See supratext accompanying notes 275-282 (providing examples of possible
sentences under Guidelines section 3A1.4 that illustrate the potential for minor
offenses greatly increasing a defendant's sentence).
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increase a defendant's time served and still comply with the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. 30 6 If this is so, two questions remain:
violates the
section 3A1.4
whether
applying U.S.S.G.
constitutional principles that underlie Booker, and which provision
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 counsels a court using its discretion to add
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 on top of U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3. In light of
the government's failure to secure convictions in high profile
material support cases, 30 7 this question is no minor tactical
consideration for the court.
VII.U.S.S.G. Secton 3A1.4's Failure to Calibrate Sentences
The failure to calibrate sentences is a key flaw in U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4. Consider a defendant who makes a financial
contribution to a DFTO and a defendant who sends that DFTO a
biological toxin. Some would argue that the two are equivalent
because delivering cash may facilitate acquiring a biological toxin.
This argument is more persuasive if the government can prove
that the defendant delivering the cash intended to facilitate
purchasing a biological toxin. Without this proof, however, there
is little basis for such a presumption.
The problem with convicting a defendant who merely knows
that an organization to which he or she donates is a DFTO that
has engaged in terrorist activities is that the donor may have
Hamas and Hezbollah stand as
other motives for donating.
examples of DFTOs that provide social services and have other
quasi-governmental functions. A donor may also be motivated by
a chance to gain personally from his or her contribution (for
example, an individual who solicits funds for a DFTO and then
keeps some portion).
U.S.S.G. sections 2M5.3 and 2M6.1 draw this distinction.
When a defendant is convicted of dealing biological toxins to a
DFTO with the intent to assist the organization, the base offense
level under U.S.S.G. section 2M6.1 is forty-two. 308 In contrast, if
the defendant intended merely to fund the purchase of weapons

306. Booker, 543 U.S. at 257-58 (noting that "Congress would not have enacted
sentencing statutes that make it more difficult to adjust sentences upward than to
adjust them downward' as a reason for the Court's determination to sever and
excise elements of the Sentencing Act).
307.

CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: U.S. EDITION 3

(2006), http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRCComplete.pdf (analyzing
510 announced terrorism cases resulting in only 158 prosecutions for terrorism or
material support, and concluding that "the vast majority of ['terrorism'] cases turn
out to include no link to terrorism once they go to court.").
308. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2M6.1

(2007).
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that are not weapons of mass destruction, then U.S.S.G. section
2M5.3 prescribes an offense level of twenty-eight. 30 9 If the
defendant intended to fund the purchase of a biological toxin,
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 directs the sentencing court to apply
310
U.S.S.G. section 2M6.1.
One hurdle to properly calibrating a defendant's sentence to
the offense is that, for most cases, the line between material
support offenses performed with general knowledge or intent and
those performed with more specific intent requirements is blurred
by the very essence of the DFTO designation and the government
exploiting the resulting ambiguity. An organization is designated
a DFTO pursuant to § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 311 To warrant the DFTO designation, a foreign organization
must either engage in "terrorist activity" as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)312 engage in "terrorism" as defined in 22 U.S.C.
§ 2656f(d)(2),313 or it must retain the capability and intent to

309. Id. § 2M5.3(b)(1).
310. Id. § 2M5.3(c)(3).
311. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, sec. 301, § 219, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 amending Immigration and Nationality
Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189(a) (2006)); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS (fTOs), FACT SHEET 2 (2005), http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/
terrorismstate/37191.pdf (providing an overview of designating Foreign Terrorist
Organizations and a list of current DFTOs).
312. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B) (2006). "Terrorist activity" is defined as:
[Any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is
committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful
under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any
of the following:
(1) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an
aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue
to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an
explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as
defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a
person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other
than for mere personal monetary gain),
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
313. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2009) ('IThe term 'terrorism' means
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engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.3 14 The organization's
terrorist activity must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or
the national security of the United States, including its national
315
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests.
These definitions of terrorist activity or terrorism mean that
the government is in a position to allege first that every defendant
who supports a DFTO supports all of the actions and objectives of
the DFTO; and, second, that every DFTO intends to coerce,
intimidate, or retaliate against government or the citizenry. Thus,
to complete the syllogism, the government may argue that any
defendant who supports a DFTO does so with the intent to support
coercion, intimidation, or retaliation against a government or the
citizenry regardless of the DFTO's other activities. In fact, the
government has taken the position that a defendant who
contributes to a DFTO knowing it is engaged in terrorist acts
should be deemed to intend to support any federal crimes of
terrorism the DFTO commits, regardless of other activities in
which the DFTO has engaged. 316 Under this argument the
distinction between violations under §§ 2339B and 2339C
disappears.
This same approach is reflected in the contrast between
U.S.S.G. sections 2M5.3 and 3A1.4.
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3
provides for an increase of two offense levels if a defendant
provides material support with the "intent, knowledge, or reason
to believe [it is] to be used to commit or assist in the commission of
a violent act. . .."317 In the Application Notes to U.S.S.G. section
2M5.3, the Sentencing Commission stated that courts applying
U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 "may consider the degree to which the
violation threatened a security interest of the United States ' 318 or
the extent to which the volume of support (including funds) or
some other facet of the offense or the number of occurrences
resulted in greater culpability, which should be reflected in an

premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.
314. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B).
315. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 311.
316. See United States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
( The government took the position that the mens rea necessary to support a
conviction under section 2339B was proof that a: 'defendant knew of the
designation of the organization as a foreign terrorist organization or the defendant
knew that the organization engaged in or had engaged in terrorist activity . .
317. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3(b)(1)(E) (2007).
318. Id. § 2M5.3, cmt. n.2(A).
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upward adjustment. 19 Arguably, U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 provides
the flexibility to calibrate the sentence to these factors based upon
an individualized inquiry.
In contrast,
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4
represents
a
philosophically different approach to material support chargesone that supports the idea that any support for a DFTO, is by
definition, support for terrorism perpetrated against the United
States or its interests.
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 makes no
distinction in the amount of "support" provided, which is to say it
does not differentiate between whether support is nominal or
constitutes millions of dollars. 320 U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 does not
discriminate among types of support, failing to differentiate
between delivery of automatic weapons, Stinger missiles, or
cash. 321 U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 does not incorporate an individual
analysis for each defendant, 322 and thus supports the conclusion
that any support for a DFTO is by definition support for a violent
act of terrorism. Calibration, if any, is derivative-arising from
the calculation of the base offense level under U.S.S.G. sections
323
2M5.3 or 2M6.1.
VIII.U.S. Courts Can and Should Deconstruct Offense
Conduct and Defendant Characteristics to Calibrate
Sentences
A key premise of this Article is that there is a critical flaw in
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, in that it fails to provide for calibrating a
defendant's sentence to his or her conduct and characteristics.
There are many meaningful distinctions between defendants
convicted of crimes of terrorism, including the "materiality" of
their support, the intent with which they gave the support, the
organization to which the support was given, the quality and
quantum of the support, the duration of the support, the
identifiable harm caused by the support, and any identifiable
victim of the support. U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 fails to account for
these differences.
Under Booker, which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines
discretionary, 324 the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) take

319. Id.
320. Id. § 3A1.4 (requiring only that offense be a "felony that involved, or was
intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism").
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 308-310, 317-319.
324. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
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on added importance. 325 No longer can judges defer to the
Sentencing Commission's judgment in taking these into account,
they must consider the factors themselves in evaluating
appropriate sentences. 326 When courts follow the instruction of 18
U.S.C. § 3553 to avoid disproportionate sentences, it is essential
that they comply with the statute by deconstructing the offense
327
conduct and the defendant's individual characteristics.
Though Booker did not create an explicit test for
calibrating sentences under the newly advisory Guidelines and the
§ 3553 factors, 328 subsequent cases are helping the courts reach
equilibrium between the two. Three recent cases illustrate the
Supreme Court's post-Booker approach to the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Rita v. United States329 concerned a defendant convicted of
making false statements to a grand jury in connection with a
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives investigation
into possible violations of gun registration and importation laws. 330
A presentence report calculated Rita's Guidelines sentence
recommendation as thirty-three to forty-one months;331 it noted
"that there 'appear[ed] to be no circumstance or combination of
circumstances that warrant a departure from the prescribed

325. See infra text accompanying notes 371-375.
326. See infra text accompanying note 373.
327. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (explaining that when a court is
determining the sentence to impose, the court must consider the "nature and
circumstances" of the offense as well as the characteristics of the offender; the need
for the sentence to reflect the gravity of the crime, promote respect for the law,
provide justice, afford deterrence, shield the public from future crimes by the
defendant, and provide the offender the needed education, medical attention, and
correctional treatment; "the kinds of sentences available;" the sentencing range
established by the Guidelines; relevant policy; the desire for consistency in
sentencing; and the need to grant restitution to victims); see United States v.
Biheiri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2005). In Biheiri, the court analyzed the
relative weight to be given to § 3553(a)(6), which cautions sentencing judges to take
care to avoid unwarranted disparities and opined, "[nior should the importance of
this goal [avoiding unwarranted disparities] be understated; it is central to a just
sentencing process, given that the essence of justice is that like cases should be
treated alike, and importantly, should be seen to be treated alike ....
" Id. at 59394. According to the court, this is a "difficult task without the sort of benchmark
that the Guidelines provide." Id. at 593.
328. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (explaining that sentencing courts should
"consider Guidelines ranges, but ... tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well" (citations omitted)).
329. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
330. Id. at 341-42.
331. Id. at 344; see id. at 342-44 (explaining the calculus that went into
determining Rita's sentence).
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sentencing guidelines."' 3 2 Rita argued for a sentence less than
that recommended by the Guidelines, relying on the sentencing
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 333 The sentencing judge
elected to adhere to the Guidelines, imposing a sentence of thirtythree months.334
Rita appealed, arguing that the judge had failed to
adequately consider his history and characteristics, and that the
sentence was greater than necessary to achieve sentencing
purposes under § 3553(a)(2). 335 The Fourth Circuit disagreed,
stating, "a sentence imposed within the properly calculated
Guidelines range ... is presumptively reasonable." 33 6 On review,
the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts. 337
In its decision, the Court specifically noted that both a
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission are instructed to
take the sentencing considerations in § 3553(a) into account. 338
The Court further noted that "[t]he Guidelines as written reflect
the fact that the Sentencing Commission examined tens of
thousands of sentences and worked with the help of many others
in the law enforcement community over a long period of time in an
effort to fulfill [its] statutory mandate." 339 According to the Court,
the Sentencing Commission's ongoing work results in "a set of
Guidelines that seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both
in principle and in practice." 340 Thus, the Court held that, even
after Booker, a reviewing court is allowed to assume that a
sentence is reasonable if it falls within the Sentencing
341
Guidelines.
Gall v. United States342 involved a college student involved
in a conspiracy to sell ecstasy. 343 Gall had participated in the
conspiracy by delivering drugs for others to sell, but withdrew
before the end of his college career, and was not indicted until two

332. Id. at 344.
333. Id. Specifically, Rita requested a departure due to vulnerability stemming
from his military experience, his poor physical condition, and his involvement in
government criminal justice work that caused people to be imprisoned and may
potentially have led to retribution against him. Id. at 344-45.
334. Id. at 345.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 346.
337. Id. at 360.
338. Id. at 347-48.
339. Id. at 349.
340. Id. at 350.
341. Id. at 341.
342. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
343. Id. at 591-92.
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years after he graduated. 344 Gall pled guilty, with the government
stipulating in his plea agreement that he had not himself
distributed ecstasy, and had made his intent to withdraw from the
conspiracy clear to others involved. 345
Nonetheless, the
government requested a Guidelines sentence.346
The sentencing judge declined, imposing a sentence of
thirty-six months probation. 347 The judge indicated that he had
considered the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) 348 and
determined that "[a]ny term of imprisonment in this case would be
counter effective by depriving society of the contributions of the
Defendant who, the Court has found, understands the
consequences of his criminal conduct and is doing everything in
his power to forge a new life." 349 The Eighth Circuit reversed,
holding that "a sentence outside of the Guidelines range must be
supported by a justification that 'is proportional to the extent of
the difference between the advisory range and the sentence
350
imposed."'
The Supreme Court reversed. 35 1 It noted that Booker's
holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory also limited
an appellate court to reviewing whether a district court judge's
sentence was reasonable and did not represent and abuse of
discretion. 352 The Court determined that the Guidelines should
serve as "the starting point and the initial benchmark" for
determining sentences. 35 3 But it rejected "an appellate rule that
requires 'extraordinary' circumstances to justify a sentence outside
the Guidelines range... [or] a rigid mathematical formula that
uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining
the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence"
as bases for determining reasonableness. 354 After reviewing the
sentencing judge's actions and justifications, 35 5 the Court

344. Id.
345. Id. at 592.
346. Id. at 593.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006)), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
351. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 602.
352. Id. at 594.
353. Id. at 596.
354. Id. at 595.
355. Id. at 598-600.
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determined that the judge had not committed an abuse of
356
discretion.
In Kimbrough v. United States,357 the Supreme Court
considered the case of a defendant convicted of drug trafficking
crimes involving crack cocaine. 358 Under the relevant statutes,
Kimbrough was eligible for a maximum sentence of fifteen
years. 359 Calculating Kimbrough's sentence under the Guidelines,
however, the sentencing court determined that Kimbrough fell
within the Guidelines range for a 228 to 270 month sentence
The judge determined that
(between 19 and 22.5 years). 36°
adhering to the Guidelines would result in a sentence "greater
than necessary" to achieve the sentencing objectives laid out in 18
U.S.C. § 3 553(a). 361 The court instead considered the § 3553(a)
factors driving sentencing, paying particular attention to the
disparity that Kimbrough faced for having dealt in crack rather
than powder cocaine. 362 These considerations led the judge to
sentence Kimbrough to 180 months, or fifteen years,
363
imprisonment.
The Fourth Circuit vacated Kimbrough's sentence on the
basis that sentencing "outside the guidelines range is per se
unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the
sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses."3 64 In
essence, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the government's
argument that, post-Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines may be
advisory and a judge may depart from them when he or she
believes that a departure best serves sentencing goals, but the
judge cannot depart because he or she disagrees with a
congressional policy decision (e.g., punishing offenses involving
crack cocaine more seriously than those involving powder
365
cocaine).

356. Id. at 600-02.
357. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
358. Id. at 564.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 565.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. United States v. Kimbrough, No. 05-4554, 2006 WL 1233525, at *1 (4th Cir.
2006) (per curiam), reu'd, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
365. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007).
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The Supreme Court disagreed. 366
The Court again
reiterated its position from Booker and Rita that the Guidelines
deserve respect because the Sentencing Commission "has the
capacity courts lack to 'base its determinations on empirical data
and national experience, guided by a professional staff with
appropriate expertise."' 367 But the Court determined that in the
case of crack cocaine Guidelines the Sentencing Commission "did
' 36
not take account of 'empirical data and national experience."'
The Court noted that "the [Sentencing] Commission itself has
reported
that
the
crack/powder
disparity
produces
disproportionately harsh sanctions . . . 'greater than necessary' in
light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)."3 69 In
light of these facts, the Court determined that the sentencing court
had not abused its discretion in "conclud[ing] when sentencing a
particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a
sentence 'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s
370
purpose."
After Rita, Kimbrough, and Gall, sentencing courts retain
their discretion to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines
established under Booker.3 7 1 The Supreme Court's guidance in
these cases, however, seems to lay out a technique for taking the
Guidelines into account in determining a defendant's sentence.
First, the sentencing judge should determine the Guidelines
sentence for a defendant. 372 Then, the judge should look to the
sentencing factors and purposes of sentencing listed in § 3553(a) to
determine whether departing from the Guidelines sentence is
warranted. 37 3 There is no formula to use in determining whether

366. Id. at 564 ("We hold that, under Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all
other Guidelines, are advisory only, and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
the crack/powder disparity effectively mandatory.").
367. Id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir.
2007) (McConnell, J., concurring), vacated, 168 S. Ct. 1869 (2008)).
368. Id. at 575 (quoting Pruitt,502 F.3d at 1171 (McConnell, J., concurring)).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 576.
371. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) ("In Booker we
invalidated.., the statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory .... ") (citation omitted)); Kimbrough v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007) ("[The Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now
serve as one factor among several courts must consider in determining an
appropriate sentence."); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) ("The
sentencing courts, applying the Guidelines in individual cases may depart (either
pursuant to the Guidelines or, since Booker, by imposing a non-Guidelines
sentence).").
372. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596.
373. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 565; Rita, 551 U.S. at 344-45.
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to depart from a Guidelines sentence, 374 and departure does not
require the court to find extraordinary circumstances. 375 The
ultimate touchstone is whether a judge believes a departure is
376
reasonable.
One case in the Fourth Circuit analyzing sentencing after
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough gives some guidance as to where
sentencing may be headed. United States v. Pauley37 7 involved
child pornography.
This sensitive subject makes the case
instructive; opining on societal consensus about culpability
associated with various crimes is a dangerous endeavor, but it is
safe to say that child pornography is one of the most universally
reviled offenses in our criminal justice system. Therefore, the
extent to which the sentencing court in Pauley was willing and
able to deconstruct the conduct of the defendant and to secure the
circuit court's approval of that analysis stands in contrast to the
approach to sentencing approach embodied in U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4.
Mr. Pauley was an art teacher in West Virginia. 378 In 2003,
he was approached by a female eighth grade student who asked
whether he was interested in paying for nude photographs of
her. 379 On three occasions Pauley purchased Polaroid photographs
from her. 380
On a fourth occasion, when he agreed to buy
photographs of the victim and her friend posing nude together, the
victim's friend reported the incident to school authorities and
Pauley was arrested. 38 1 Prosecutors determined that seventeen
photographs of the twenty-five he had bought contained images of
38 2
child pornography.
Mr. Pauley pled guilty to one count of possessing child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).3 8 3 The
Guidelines prison sentence range was between seventy-eight and

374. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.
375. Id.
376. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005) (asserting that the
sentencing "factors and the past two decades of appellate practice in cases involving
departures from the Guidelines imply a familiar and practical standard of review:
review for 'unreasonable[ness]."').
377. 511 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007).
378. Id. at 469.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 469-70.
382. Id. at 470.
383. Id.

2010]

Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4

ninety-seven months imprisonment, 3 4 but after considering the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) the district court
determined that forty-two months imprisonment was a sufficient
sentence.38 5 The government appealed and the Fourth Circuit
38 6
affirmed.
The district court made the following determinations in
support of its decision to vary from the Guidelines sentence: (1) the
victim initiated each of the transactions; (2) fewer than two dozen
pornographic photographs were taken; (3) the victim's face did not
appear in the photographs; (4) Pauley displayed deep remorse; (5)
prior to this offense Pauley was a good citizen, father, and teacher;
(6) Pauley suffered collateral punishment, including loss of his
teaching certificate and his pension; (7) Pauley agreed to a lifetime
of supervised release; (8) no other child pornography was found in
the Pauley house; and (9) incarceration counseling would
rehabilitate him and allow him to lead a productive life upon
38 7
release.
What is instructive about the Pauley decision is the latitude
the district court used in deconstructing the crime, the collateral
punishment, the defendant himself, and the prospect of
rehabilitation. Based upon his personal history and the court's
assessment, the district court expressed confidence that he was
unlikely to reoffend. 38s The court also considered Mr. Pauley's loss
of his teaching certificate and state pension to be collateral
384. Id. The probation officer's recommendations for the defendant's sentence
started with a base offense level of fifteen. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2G2.4(a) (2002). Because the offense involved causing a minor to engage in
sexually explicit conduct in order to produce a visual image of the conduct, the
probation officer applied the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor Guideline, raising the
offense level to twenty-seven. Id. § 2G2.1. The officer then recommended adding
two more offense levels because the victim was above the age of twelve but below
the age of sixteen. Id. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(B). Furthermore, because the victim was a
student at the same school in which the defendant taught, potentially bringing her
within his supervisory control, the offense level increased another two levels. Id.
§ 2G2.1(b)(2). Finally, the probation officer recommended raising the offense level
another two levels, arguing that the victim was vulnerable. Id. § 3Al.1(b)(1). The
offense level was next reduced by three levels because the defendant accepted
responsibility for the crime. Id. § 3El.1. The final offense level was thirty. At
sentencing, the district court sustained the defendant's objection to the increase
based on the vulnerable victim argument, reducing the sentencing range to
between seventy-eight and ninety-seven months. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 470.
385. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 470.
386. Id. at 469.
387. Id. at 470.
388. Id. at 470, 475 (noting that Pauley's Criminal History Category was I and
approving the district court's determination "that a lifetime of supervised release
would reduce the risk of Pauley becoming a repeat offender and would deter him
from future criminal conduct").
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punishment affecting the sentence. 389 On appeal, the government
argued that the sentence should be vacated because the district
court placed "excessive weight" on one factor: Mr. Pauley's history
and characteristics.390 The Fourth Circuit panel held that it was
within the district court's discretion to conduct the analysis as it
39
had. 1
Deconstructing defendants and their offenses, and placing
both on the spectrum of similar defendants convicted of similar
crimes, is classic sentencing practice. 392 It requires nuance and
careful discrimination between and among cases and defendants
based on the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.393 That
nuance is impossible under a Guideline that is structured as
bluntly as U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4. A Guideline can account for
deconstructing a discrete offense and specific defendant. U.S.S.G.
sections 2M5.3 and 2M6.1 are not paragons of sophistication in
this regard, but they do permit some differentiation between and
among defendants and offenses. 394 After Blakely, Booker, Rita,
and Gall, that differentiation and nuance is no longer merely
desirable--it is constitutionally required. 395
U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4 is an impediment to that constitutionally required analysis.
389. Id. at 470. The Fourth Circuit panel employed a broad and pragmatic
reading of § 3553(a) in holding that Pauley's loss of his teaching certificate and
pension was consistent with § 3553(a)'s directive that a sentence reflect the need
for "just punishment" and "adequate deterrence."
390. Id. at 475.
391. Id. at 475-76.
392. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) (prescribing that judges consider
"the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct" when imposing
sentences).
393. Id. § 3553 (listing considerations for a court to take into account during
sentencing).
394. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2M5.3 and 2M6.1 (2007)
(spelling out base offense levels and special offense characteristics which can be
used to increase the offense levels, allowing for consideration of specific qualities of
a defendant's crime).
395. The constitutional requirement of differentiation and nuance between
defendants and offenses requires the exercise of judicial discretion and
consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors. See Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 357 (2007) (explaining that the lower court judge fully considered each
argument advanced in favor of lower the sentence and was "fully aware of
defendant's various physical ailments" and considered special circumstances, such
as military service); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007) (showing that
the district court judge discussed at great length the sentence imposed on a codefendant and comparing and contrasting the two individuals, and thus did not
commit a procedural error); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 251 (2005)
(explaining that judges have often looked to presentencing reports, background,
character, and conduct of a defendant when determining sentence, a practice
Congress intended to continue); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14
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IX. Sentence Disproportionality in Material Support Cases
Despite courts' increased discretion post-Booker, Rita,
Kimbrough, and Gall, disproportionate sentences under U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 persist. In federal fiscal year 2007, 60.8% of all
criminal sentences were within the Guidelines range. 396 Excluding
below-range sentences given pursuant to U.S.S.G. sections 5K1.1
and 5K3.1 or other government-sponsorship, after Booker
approximately 12.1% of the sentences were below the Guidelines
range. 397 Only 1.5% of all cases resulted in a sentence above the
Guidelines range. 398 The fact that such a high percentage of
sentences were below the Guidelines range before Rita, Gall, and
Kimbrough indicates that the district courts were taking
advantage of their limited post-Booker authority to mitigate the
Guidelines' impact.
In fiscal year 2007, the Sentencing Commission reported that
the base offense Guideline for material support cases, U.S.S.G.
section 2M5.3, was used as a Guideline in eight cases and of those,
six cases primarily relied on it. 39 9 U.S.S.G. section 2M6.1 was
used as the primary Guideline in all five cases that cited it.400 Of
the 63,882 sentencings in fiscal year 2007, twenty involved
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4.401 According to Sentencing Commission
statistics, "national defense cases" had a mean sentence of 48.9
months and a median of 22.5 months 402 compared to a mean
40 3
sentence for all cases of 60.4 months and a median of 37 months.

(2004) (holding that a jury must first determine any additional facts be considered
for sentencing).
396. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCE
STATISTICS 167 tbl.14 (2007).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 40 tbl.17.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 41 tbl.18. There were a total of 72,865 cases, but the Sentencing
Commission only received complete Guidelines application information for 63,906
of them. Id. at 42 tbl.18 n.1. There were twenty-four terrorism cases for which the
Commission did not have sufficient information. Id.
402. Id. at 30 tbl.14. It is unclear from the 2007 Sourcebook, supra note 396,
exactly what constitutes a "national defense case," but it is reasonable to conclude
that these cases include offenses sentenced under United States Sentencing
Guidelines Chapter Two, Part M addressing "Offenses Involving National Defense
and Weapons of Mass Destruction." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.
2, pt. M (2007).
There are twenty-six national defense cases in the 2007
Sourcebook. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 396, at 30 tbl.14. Of those,
twenty-one cases involved defendants with a Criminal History Category I; in one
case, the defendant was in Criminal History Category III; in four cases the
defendant was in Criminal History Category VI (non-career offender); and there
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For fiscal year 2008, the Sentencing Commission reported a
total of forty-five "national defense cases." 40 4 The mean sentence
405
for all cases was 62.5 months and the median was 30 months.
For the three cases in which the defendant was in Criminal
History Category VI, the mean sentence was 376.7 months and
median was 360 months. 40 6 U.S.S.G. section 2M5.3 was the
primary Guideline in fourteen cases, 407 section 2M6.1 was the
primary Guideline in five cases, 408 and section 3A1.4 was applied
40 9
in eleven cases.
Professor Robert M. Chesney of Wake Forest University Law
School examined the prison sentences imposed on defendants who
have pled guilty to or been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B. 410 Professor Chesney found that between September
2001 and July 2007, a total of 108 individuals were charged with
at least one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 411 The mean of all the
§ 2339B sentences was 122.73 months, with a median of 120
months and a mode of 180 months. 412 In cases where the
defendant was found guilty after a jury trial, the median prison
sentence was 180 months for conspiracy and attempt and 150
were no cases in which the defendant had Criminal History Category II, IV, V, or
VI (career offender). Id. at 30-31 tbl.14.
403. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 396, at 30 tbl.14.
404. THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCE
Like the
STATISTICS tbl.14, http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOCO8.htm.
2007 Sourcebook, the 2008 Sourcebook does not provide a definition of "national
defense cases," but it remains reasonable to conclude that these cases include
offenses sentenced under United States Sentencing Guidelines Chapter Two, Part
M addressing "Offenses Involving National Defense and Weapons of Mass
Destruction." See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, pt. M (2007).
405. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 404, tbl.14.
406. Id.
407. Id. tbl.17.
408. Id.
409. Id. tbl.18.
410. Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses:
Convictions and Sentencing Data in Light of the "Soft-Sentence" and "DataReliability" Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 851 (2007).
411. Id. at 884 (including direct violations, conspiracies, and attempts). Of
those charges, forty-six were pending at the time the article was published, twentythree defendants so charged were not yet in U.S. custody, and twenty-three others
were in custody and awaiting trial. Id. Of the remaining sixty-two defendants in
Professor Chesney's database, nine were convicted by jury and thirty others pled
guilty. Id. Eleven defendants pled guilty to other charges and the § 2339B counts
against them were dropped. Id. Eleven defendants were acquitted or successfully
moved to have the charges dismissed. Id. Charges against one defendant were
dropped when he died. Id.
412. Id. at 886. One defendant received sentences for two separate charges
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, and these numbers reflect Professor Chesney's
calculations taking into account the higher sentence. Id.
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months for direct violations; 413 the mode was 180 months for all
§ 2339B offenses. 414 As discussed above, when applying U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4, the minimum sentence for offenses involving a
federal crime of terrorism is between 210 and 262 months. 415 The
minimum U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 sentence is approximately 171%
of the mean sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B cases analyzed by
Professor Chesney. The maximum sentence from the stated range
416
is approximately 213% above the mean § 2339B sentence.
X. U.S.S.G. Section
History Category

3A1.4's

Manipulation

of

Criminal

It is difficult to isolate any one factor in U.S.S.G. section
3A1.4's sentencing calculus that is most flawed, but if one were
forced to do so, the factor that most drives the dramatic increases
in sentences is fixing defendants' Criminal History Categories at
VI. Eighteen U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) requires a court to consider a
defendant's history and characteristics in making its sentencing
determinations. 417 To evaluate U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 under that
standard, it is important to ask two questions.
First, what
evidence does the Sentencing Commission rely upon to support a
legal presumption that every defendant is properly a Criminal
History Category VI? Second, does the evidence support a shift in
every case? One effect of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is to exacerbate
disparities between the sentences of similar defendants for similar
conduct, because this Guideline instructs a sentencing court to
substitute an artificial determination for each individual
defendant's true characteristics.418

413 Id. at 888.
414. Id.
415. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
(2007).
416. Since section 3A1.4 of the U.S.S.G. is an adjustment made after the base
offense and other adjustments have been calculated, when the adjusted offense
level is above twenty before applying section 3A1.4, the sentence is driven even
higher, and the ratio of that sentence to the mean for all § 2339B cases will be even
greater. See id. § 3A1.4(a) (instructing that a defendant's base offense level should
be raised to level thirty-two, or by twelve levels, whichever is greater, with the
result that a defendant whose base offense level is greater than twenty will have a
Guidelines sentence range of greater than 210 to 262 months); see also id. ch. 5, pt.
A, sentencing tbl. (providing longer prison sentences for defendants with higher
offense levels). These statistics indicate courts are taking steps to mitigate section
3A1.4 or are simply not adding the enhancement. See infra note 456 for discussion
of jurisdictions that deviate from the Guidelines.
417. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
418. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(b) (instructing that a
defendant sentenced under the Guideline is to automatically receive an enhanced
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The Sentencing Guidelines have legitimacy only if they are
based in valid statistics and principles. 4 19 The Supreme Court and
the Sentencing Commission have opined that the deference to be
given to the Sentencing Guidelines derives principally from the
fact that the Guidelines were developed based on the experience of
thousands of cases over a period of years. 420 But when U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 was adopted, the number of the anti-terrorism cases
was tiny, so there could be no analysis of a statistically reliable
group of defendants upon which to build a reliable Guideline.421

Criminal History Category, without mandating individualized consideration of
whether this is appropriate for the individual defendant). Before Booker, the
Second Circuit determined that Guidelines Manual section 3A1.4(b)'s boost of a
criminal history to a Category VI for a single act of terrorism by a first-time
offender with no prior criminal behavior was not double counting. United States v.
Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). The court justified this holding on the
theory that a terrorist with no prior criminal record nonetheless might have a
likelihood of recidivism and may be particularly difficult to rehabilitate, and,
therefore, may merit incarceration for a long period of time. Id. However, the
Second Circuit also cautioned that if a judge determined that section 3A1.4(b)
overrepresented the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct and the
likelihood that he or she would commit other crimes, the court "always has the
discretion under § 4A1.3 to depart downward in sentencing." Id.
419. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007) (outlining the
"empirical approach" that the Sentencing Commission used to structure
the
Sentencing Guidelines); cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2007)
(listing honesty, uniformity, and proportionality as Congress' objectives in creating
the Sentencing Guidelines).
420. E.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 349 ("The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that
the Sentencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked
with the help of many others in the law enforcement community over a long period
of time...."); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) ("[T]he
Commission has sought to solve both the practical and philosophical problems of
developing a coherent sentencing system by taking an empirical approach that uses
data estimating the existing sentencing system as a starting point. It has analyzed
data drawn from 10,000 presentence investigations, crimes as distinguished in
substantive criminal statute, the United States Parole Commission's guidelines
and resulting statistics, and data from other relevant sources, in order to determine
which distinctions are important in present practice.").
421. United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3A1.4 went into effect
November 1, 1995. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4, historical n.
Pre-1997 statistics on terrorism cases are not readily available or reliable. Even
looking to statistics post-enactment, in 1997 there were only eight indictments for
international terrorism offenses, in 1998 a total of seven, in 1999 a total of twentynine, and in 2000 a total of fourteen. See TRAC REPORTS, A SPECIAL TRAC
REPORT: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AGAINST TERRORISTS (2002), http://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/terrorism/report01 1203.html. Post-2001 cases show an exponential
growth in investigations, charges, and prosecutions, but not a large number of
cases overall. See CTR.ON LAW AND SEC., supra note 307.
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A. Recidivism and the U.S.S.G.
When the Sentencing Commission was created, it did not
have the time or resources to create a measure of the risk of
recidivism, so it relied on existing measures. 422 These included the
United States Parole Commission Recidivism Predictor-the
Salient Factor Score (SFS).423 The Sentencing Commission's
Criminal History Categories scale (CHC) and the SFS scale
consider: the frequency and seriousness of criminal history,
whether the instant offense was conducted while under criminal
justice supervision, and the recency of the prior offenses in
determining the risk of recidivism. 424 The two methods differ in
two factors: the CHC considers whether the prior offense conduct
involved violence, 425 and the SFS takes into account the offender's
age.

4 26

The SFS is intended to assess only the probability of
recidivism, 427 while the CHC has as its "core philosophy" the
additional purpose of "just punishment and deterrence."428 This
component is explained in the Introductory Comments to Chapter
4, Part A of the Guidelines. 429 The current offense alone does not
determine culpability, a defendant's prior criminal behavior also
comes into play. 430 The Sentencing Commission states that its
policy of "[gleneral deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a
clear message be sent to society that repeated criminal behavior
431
will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence."
Since its adoption, the SFS's reliability has "been continually
tested, reformatted, and evaluated .... 4, 32
The Sentencing
Commission staff433 analyzed how to improve the CHC by using
recidivism data to test the predictive power of the SFS and the
422. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD ET AL., A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND THE U.S. PAROLE
COMMISSION SALIENT FACTOR SCORE 3 (2005), www.ussc.gov/publicat/
recidivismsalientfactorcom.pdf.
423. Id. at 1, 2-3.
424. Id. at 5-7.
425. Id. at 7.
426. Id. at 7-8. The report notes, however, that "the 'decay' factor of the CHC is
often interpreted as a proxy for age at current offense." Id. at 8.
427. Id. at 3.
428. Id.
429. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.4, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2007).
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. MAXFIELD ET AL., supra note 422, at 3.
433. Id. at title page (identifying the Sentencing Commission staff as authors).
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CHC. 4 3 4

The staff found that the SFS is the better predictor of
recidivism 435 and suggested that the CHC's power to predict
recidivism could be greater than the SFS's if it incorporated two
elements from the SFS. 4 36 These elements were an age factor and
a first offender status factor. 437 Both are relevant to U.S.S.G.
section 3A1.4 analysis.
The Sentencing Commission staff has concluded that first
offenders are unique, 438 and consequently distinguished first
offenders within the procedural structure of the Guidelines. 439 The
Sentencing Commission, however, did not create a separate
Criminal History Category for first offenders. 440 That decision
prompted the Sentencing Commission, fifteen years later, to
441
analyze recidivism data to assess the need for such a category.
The resulting recidivism study found that a first offender with no
prior arrests has a 2.5% probability of a second conviction; a first
offender with arrests, but no convictions, has a 5.3% chance of a
second conviction; and a first offender with convictions on minor
offenses that do not generate a Criminal History Category point
442
has a 2.9% chance of a second conviction.
Many of the defendants against whom material support cases
have been brought have no prior criminal history.443 There is no
434. Id. at 8-15.
435. Id. at 12.
436. Id. at 15-16.
437. Id.
438. See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD ET AL., RECIDrvIsM AND THE "FIRST
OFFENDER" 2 (2004), www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism-FirstOffender.pdf.
439. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2006). ("The [Sentencing] Commission shall insure
that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other
than imprisonment in cases in which the Defendant is a first offender who has not
been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense.").
440. MAXFIELD ET AL., supra note 438, at 1 ("[O]ffenders with the least number
of prior criminal convictions are classified into Criminal History Category I
("CHC I")... [but] CHC I is more broadly defined than "first offenders." While
offenders with zero criminal history points are included, CHC I also applies to
offenders with a prior conviction receiving one criminal history point.").
441. Id. at 2.
442. Id. at 26.
443. See, e.g., United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 2008)
(finding that Chandia's sentencing enhancement was not properly assessed due to
his lack of a criminal history); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.
2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), sentence vacated, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th
Cir. 2005) (stating Hammoud would have been placed in a Category I if not for the
enhancement); United States v. Warsame, No. 04-29, 2009 WL 2611277, at *2 (D.
Minn. 2009) (finding the material support enhancement raised Warsame's
Criminal History Category from I to VI); United States v. Aref, No. 04-CR-402,
2007 WL 804814, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that placing the defendant in
Criminal History Category VI substantially over-represented the seriousness of his
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published statistical data demonstrating that defendants
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B, 2339C, or other antiterrorism statutes-and especially those convicted of financing
offenses-are any more likely to be recidivists than any other first
offenders. 444 Nothing in the history of U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4
would indicate that any reliable data was used to determine if a
person convicted of a material support offense is more likely to be
445
a recidivist.
B. ComparingDefendants Sentenced Under U.S.S.G.
Section 3A1.4 and Defendants Sentenced as Career
Offenders
There is no true analog to U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's
manipulation of criminal history, but comparing it to U.S.S.G.
section 4B1.1 (the "Career Offender" Guideline) 446 is instructive.
U.S.S.G. section 4B1.1 defines a career offender was a defendant
who is at least eighteen years of age at the time he or she
committed the current offense; has committed a felony that is
either a crime of violence or a drug offense; and has had at least
two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a drug
offense. 447 In these circumstances, the defendant becomes a
448
Category VI offender and specified offense levels apply.
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's fixing a defendant's Criminal
History Category at VI creates an irrebuttable legal presumption
that the defendant is a recidivist career offender who cannot be
deterred by fear of prison and who is certain to commit serious
offenses in the future. 449 Like U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, the "Career

criminal history).
444. Cf. CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., supra note 307 (highlighting the relatively
minimal usage of the statute and the lack of substantive data on collective
characteristics of offenders who have been convicted of financing terrorism).
445. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
446. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2007).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2007). This comment introduces the Guidelines in the chapter addressing how a
defendant's Criminal History Category is determined. Id. ch. 4, pt. A ("Criminal
History"). But see id. ch. 4, pt. B (addressing "Career Offenders" and setting their
Criminal History Category, in every case, as VI). The Sentencing Commission
states that "a defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable
than a first offender and thus deserving of a greater punishment" and that
"[r]epeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful
rehabilitation." Id. ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 28:51

Offender" Guideline substitutes a legal presumption for an
individualized profile. 450 But U.S.S.G. section 4B1.1 has some
claim to be predictive, because it requires evidence of
particularized recidivism in that the defendant must have two
prior felony convictions and those felonies must be crimes of
violence or drug offenses. 45 1 Furthermore, the new offense for
which the defendant is being sentenced must also be a crime of
violence or a drug offense, 452 indicating habitual behavior
warranting the highest Criminal History Category.
The presumption under U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is
incompatible with 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which requires that a
defendant be evaluated individually to justify his or her
sentence. 453 Worse, U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4's presumption is not
based on a study of the recidivism of those convicted of material
support or any other empirical evidence. 454 By focusing on prior
convictions, the CHC heightens culpability based upon the
defendant's decision to engage in recurrent criminal activity as
demonstrated by prior convictions. 455 Nonetheless, post-Booker,
but pre-Kimbrough, Rita, and Gall, a number of courts held that
the "Career Offender" Guideline produces sentences that are
greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and so did not apply the Guidelines
faithfully. 456
One court reasoned that "Career45 7Offender"
presumptions are "fraught with potential imprecision."

450. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 ("A career offender's
criminal history category in every case under this subsection shall be Category VI."
(emphasis added)).
451. Id. § 4B1.1(a).
452. Id.
453. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
454. United States v. Awan, No. CR-06-0154, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51772 *5-6
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 took
effect in November 1995, and "there is limited legislative or administrative history
discussing how and why this sentencing enhancement came into being."); see supra
text accompanying note 421.
455. MAXFIELD ET AL., supranote 422, at 3-4.
456. In United States v. Moreland, the Fourth Circuit addressed the sentence
imposed upon a defendant treated as a career offender with a Guidelines prison
sentence range of thirty years to life because of two minor, prior non-violent drug
offenses. 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court imposed a sentence of ten
years, one-third the Guidelines sentence. Id. at 428. The Fourth Circuit found that
a departure was warranted, because the defendant's prior history did not justify
the career offender designation, though it concluded that the district court judge
committed a clear error in judgment and remanded for a sentence of at least twenty
years. Id. at 436-37; see also United States v. MacKinnon, 401 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.
2005) (remanding for re-sentencing post-Booker when the district court, ruling
before Booker, found that the "Career Offender" Guideline produced a sentence that
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Conclusion
U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4 is not consistent with congressionally
established penalties for the offense of providing material support
to a designated foreign terrorist organization.
Neither is it
consistent with the related Guidelines.
Its treatment of
defendants-especially first offenders-as undeterrable and
incorrigible recidivists is inconsistent with sentencing policy and
the available study data. If constitutionally valid, its impact on
sentences based upon a defendant's intent-a classic essential
element of an offense-determined by a judge by a preponderance
of the evidence, must at a minimum raise disturbing questions
about the fairness and integrity of the sentencing process. In
addition to all of the sentencing-related questions about the
Guideline, questions of whether it represents beneficial antiterrorism policy remain. Nuance in sentencing those guilty of
"material support" is better anti-terrorism policy, as well as better
sentencing policy. U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4, in its deviation from
existing Guidelines policy and failure to account for the specific
attributes of each offense and defendant, represents the worst in
U.S. sentencing policy, and as such should be abandoned.

was "obscene" and "unwarranted by the conduct"); United States v. Burhoe, 409
F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2005) (remanding for a second examination of the Guidelines in
the interest of reducing the sentence because the defendant did not fit the personal
profile of a career offender); United States v. Carvajal, No. 04-CR-222, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3076, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating the "Career Offender" Guideline
is "the same regardless of the severity of the crimes, the dangers posed to victims'
and bystanders' lives, and other appropriate criteria"); United States v. Hubbard,
369 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D. Mass. 2005) (imposing sentence of 108 months rather
than the 188 to 235 month "Career Offender" range based on diminished capacity
from an "appallingly traumatic childhood" which "directly precipitated his life on
the streets and his conduct as a career offender"); United States v. Person, 377 F.
Supp. 2d 308, 310 (D. Mass. 2005) (departing downward from a 262 to an 84 month
sentence where the court determined that designating the defendant a "Career
Offender" based on one prior charge each of drug distribution, assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon, and resisting arrest "grossly overstated" the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history); United States v. Williams, 372 F.
Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2005), vacated, 456 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2006)
(sentencing the defendant to 204 months because the "Career Offender" sentence of
360 months to life was "out of character with the seriousness" of the offense, was
not necessary to achieve deterrence or incapacitation, and would undermine respect
for law).
457. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 436.

